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The purpose of this paper is to provide an insightful analysis of the value creation in 
leveraged buyouts from two different lenses: value creation and value earned. To do 
so, this paper has been structured in three parts. In part one, the main value creation 
levers in LBOs are identified from an extensive literature review based on the current 
state of research in the topic. These value creation levers have been classified 
according to the stakeholders accountable for the value created through each of the 
levers, namely, the Private Equity fund, the Management team and the debt holders. 
In part two, various propositions to calculate the value earned by the different 
stakeholders of the LBO are described, including the value earned by the target 
company as an additional stakeholder.  
Last but not least, part three consists on the case study of Applus+, a Spanish 
company leader in the TIC industry. In this case study, the different value creation 
levers described in part one are analysed, as well as the value earned by the different 
stakeholders. The result of the case study is that value was essentially created through 
a combination of multiple acquisitions and a high leverage, backed by disciplined cash-
flow management. Furthermore, the analysis of the value earned by the different 
stakeholders shows an uneven distribution of the value earned.  
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Part I. Value creation levers in 
Leveraged Buyouts  
Value creation at the Private Equity fund level 
 
Deal sourcing, selection skills and market timing 
 
Private equity firms are widely known to be secretive in almost any aspect of its 
activities. One of the areas of secrecy, where there is not much academic research 
either, is the actual practices and skills that private equity managers use and to find 
investment opportunities.  
 
Private equity fund managers have to show investment skills, both in buying and 
selling. Goold and Barbet (Goold & Barber, 2007) consider that one of the questions 
when assessing the ability of firms to undertake private equity deals is “Can you spot 
and correctly value businesses with improvement opportunities?”  
 
On average, private equity firms close 3.6% of the deals they consider as potential 
opportunities (Gompers, Kaplan, & Mukharlyamo, 2016). Indeed, private equity firms 
seem to dedicate extensive efforts to this stage of the value chain. According to 
Gompers, Kaplan & Mukharlyamo (Gompers, Kaplan, & Mukharlyamo, 2016), private 
equity firms consider that around half of the deals they go through are self-sourced, as 
opposed to generated by investment banks, deal-brokers or other private equity firms. 
Furthermore, some research suggests that proprietary deals perform better than those 
sourced externally (Loos, 2005). These findings highlight the importance of the 
extensive professional networks and connections of the private equity fund managers 
as sources of potentially successful deals.   
 
Private equity firms trust their analysts’ skills in projecting cash-flow generation ability 
of the target and detecting improvement opportunities. This is consistent with the 
findings of Gompers, Kaplan & Mukharlyamo (Gompers, Kaplan, & Mukharlyamo, 
2016) after interviewing 76 private equity firms: the most important aspect for private 
equity firms when deciding upon investing in a company is its business model and the 
forecasts provided by the management of the target. Strong LBO backed target 
business models usually enjoy strong market positioning, stable cash-flows and low 
CAPEX, (Private Equity Investment Criteria, 2015). Private equity managers will 
discount the forecasts provided by the target management if they are deemed too 
optimistic, and then will use the resulting business plan as a base to value the target 
company.  
 
Management team and value-addition possibilities by the private equity firm come later 
in importance. Surprisingly enough, according to Gompers, Kaplan and Mukharlyamo, 
the industry is not as relevant for the interviewed private equity firms. Further research 




One could infer from the previous paragraph that due diligence is a crucial step in the 
decision of investing in a potential target. However, in most academic research, due 
diligence is not really considered as value-adding upon private equity manager’s views.   
 
A usual way to evaluate the investment skills of fund managers is by differentiating 
between asset allocation, security selection and market timing. In this case, asset 
allocation is constrained to LBO-backed private equity investments. However, it is not 
usual to distinguish between security selection and market timing when assessing the 
skills of private equity fund managers. Business plan analysis and cash-flow 
forecasting can be considered as part of security selection skillset in private equity. On 
the other side, Schmidt, Nowak and Knigge concluded that for private equity funds, 
”fund performance is not driven by market timing but rather significantly related to the 
experience of the individual fund manager” (Schmidt , Nowak, & Knigge, 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, Kaplan and Strömberg found evidence that private equity fund managers 
“take advantage of market timing and market mispricing between equity markets and 
debt markets” to improve their returns (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008). As it will be 
developed in a section dedicated to leverage, these trends result in a strong correlation 
between the state of debt markets and the state of the private equity industry.  
Rather than underestimating security selection for private equity investments, these 
findings underline the importance of finding optimal capital structures for the targets as 
one of the skillsets of private equity managers.  
 
All in all, deal sourcing capacity, business model analysis and cash-flow forecasting 
can be inferred from this section as potential value creation levers in LBOs by the 
private equity funds.   
 
Negotiation skills & asymmetric information 
 
Private equity fund managers have a strong interest in pushing down initial valuations 
to acquire targets at lower prices and improve future returns.  
There is evidence in the fact that private equity firms tend to pay less for comparable 
targets than strategic buyers do. Intuitively, this makes sense as strategic buyers’ 
investment scope is more reduced than that of private equity firms and will therefore be 
willing to pay a premium for a one-shot opportunity of creating synergies. On the other 
side, private equity firms screen multiple options before seriously considering an 
investment opportunity. 
Butler also suggests that private equity managers are tough negotiators and tend to 
drive acquisition prices down from initially agreed prices as a consequence of finding 
company inefficiencies or hidden liabilities while they run due diligences on their 
targets (Butler, 2001).  
One extensive practice in the negotiation of acquisition prices in LBOs is the use of 
Earn-out clauses. Earn-outs are aimed at closing the gap between the price that 
acquirers are willing to pay and the price at which sellers are willing to sell the target 
company. By using earn-outs, sellers will earn extra payments in the future, based on 
the achievement of some key post-LBO performance milestones by the company such 
as minimum EBITDA, sales...etc.  
 6 
 
Beyond the industry expertise that private equity managers acquire by going through 
numerous deals, some critics suggest that they also benefit from asymmetric 
information during the negotiation process. Incumbent management would be the 
source of this insider information as their business plans and forecasts are the basis for 
the acquisition negotiations. Management is supposed to be better informed on the 
performance and potential of the company than the shareholders. Therefore, this 
theory suggests that managers could be incentivized by attractive economic benefits 
and the believe that the company will be better off under the close monitoring of a 
private equity firm. Hence, they could cook performance forecasts to push down the 
valuation of the company.  
 
However, researchers agree in finding arguments against this potential conflict of 
interests during the acquisition of the company. An argument shared by Kaplan & 
Strömberg (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008), as well as by Loos (Loos, 2005) is that in most 
of the deals, pre-transaction management changes before its completion.  
 
Additionally, according to Loos (Loos, 2005), the more usual participation of external 
counsellors and independent advisors, as well as the use of limited open auctions in 
acquisition processes should also reduce the effects of potential agency problem. This 
is the result of more informed investors in increasingly efficient markets, as well as the 
existing precedents of court decisions in addressing agency conflicts.  
 
In any case, strong negotiation skills can be considered within the toolbox of value 
creation levers for LBOs required at the private equity fund level.  
 
Corporate governance improvements 
 
From an agency theory point of view, the interests of private equity fund are by 
definition aligned with those of the actual owners of an LBO participated company, i.e., 
the investors in the private equity fund, a.k.a., the Limited Partners (LPs). The source 
of this alignment is the typical 2-20 business model of the private equity fund. Besides 
a 1-2% management fee over assets under management, private equity fund 
managers earn usually 20% of the gains of the investment.  
 
Private equity managers, or analogously, the General Partners (GPs) of the funds, take 
controlling positions on the board of the companies they participate in and behave as 
active investors. This means that they aim at defending LP’s interests by controlling 
their acquisitions thanks to holding considerable presence on their boards.  
 
Not only do GPs monitor management performance, but they can also exert their 
influence in the board to impose their views on the strategic decisions that the 
company should take, to the point that it must be difficult to differentiate if the origin of 
managerial action is on the GPs or the managers of the company.  
 
For some practitioners, this is one of the most important value adding levers in private 
equity deals (Beroutsos, Freeman, & Kehoe, 2007). Smaller boards than those of 
comparable public firms facilitate board’s involvement on the activities of the company. 
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Loss (Loos, 2005) found evidence of positive effects in value creation for LBOs due to 
changes in corporate governance, by comparing the change in performance in 
companies with lower participation by shareholders before an LBO transaction.   
 
Corporate governance improvement through the activism of the private equity funds in 





Private equity funds typically plan an exit strategy for the target at the moment of the 
acquisition to prepare for an exit both upon achieving the expected performance of the 
investment or not.  
 
In order to have full control on the potential exit of the investment, private equity funds 
aim at achieving control over the board of the target company. Additionally, they 
negotiate the inclusion of control clauses in the by-laws of the target company, such as 
registration rights, redemption rights, and drag-along or tag-along rights (La Lande, 
2011). 
 
The role of management is key in the value creation in LBOs. Besides the usual 
incentive plans for managers, private equity funds might also elaborate incentive plans 
for management teams to stay in the company after potential exits, as they are 
conscious that this might have a strong effect on the valuation of the company at exit 
(La Lande, 2011).  
 
Negotiation skills and proprietary professional networks of private equity managers are 
also important when sourcing potential acquirers after an LBO. There are four typical 
exits from LBO investments:  Initial Public Offering, Strategic Sale, Secondary LBO 
(SBO) and Dividend Recapitalization. 
 
In an IPO, the private equity fund sells part of its participation to the public markets. 
While usually high valuations are achieved through IPOs, they do not allow a complete 
exit by the fund for two principal reasons to avoid detrimental signalling and excess 
supply of shares. While none-complete exits are usually against the limited time 
commitment of private equity funds, gradual sales of stakes through IPOs might let 
investors achieve higher returns by timing their exit.  
 
Private equity funds can exit their investments through strategic sales by selling the 
participated company to a buyer that would expect to achieve synergies from this 
acquisition. For this reason, strategic buyers are usually willing to pay a control 
premium.  
 
In secondary LBOs, the private equity fund sells the company to another financial 
sponsor without synergetic goals, which usually acquires the company with a mix of 
debt and equity. Usually exit valuations will be lower as these secondary investors look 
for undervalued companies and are used to negotiating acquisition prices.  
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Last but not least, in a leveraged dividend recapitalization, investors receive an extra 
dividend that is financed by rising new debt in the target company. Dividends are used 
as well in certain circumstances to refinance bridge loans.This way, investors get 
protected from any downside while still keeping control of the company. Private equity 
funds that use leveraged dividend recapitalizations usually receive bad press. 
 
According to Loos, “IPOs yield the highest return, even though in Europe, strategic 
sales are becoming increasingly attractive” (Loos, 2005). Furthermore, he also 
observed that deals with the longest holding periods tend to perform worse in terms of 
returns. 
 
However, Sudarsanam did not find any statistically significant relationship between 
returns and the exit mode when comparing 104 UK deals that were exited through IPO, 
strategic sale or SBO (Sudarsanam , 2005).  
 
In any case, a successful exit strategy is key for investors to maximize the value 
earned from their private equity investments. 
 
Agency theory. Aligning the interests of Managers and Shareholders 
 
There are essentially two ways through which interests of management are especially 
aligned with those of the shareholders in a LBO: Management ownership of the equity 
of the acquired company and the discipline introduced by the high leverage of the 
company.  
 
Management incentives and ownership 
  
Private equity managers design thoughtful incentive plans for the managers of the 
participated companies to make sure they work hard towards achieving the pressing 
performance objectives established in the acquisition business plan.  
 
These plans are usually composed of base salary, bonus opportunities linked to KPIs 
and co-investment opportunities or long term equity grants based on performance 
(Beroutsos, Freeman, & Kehoe, 2007). Additionally, the private equity acquirer usually 
expects the managers to invest into the acquired company along, so that managers 
take part especially of the downsides of the investment. Historically, the amount of 
money required to be invested by mangers was usually referred to as the hurt money, 
meaning that it was supposed to represent a significant amount relative to the 
managers’ individual wealth (Gilligan & Wright, 2014).  
 
Typically, performance based management compensation is linked to achieving annual 
EBITDA targets, making scheduled debt repayments on time or realizing a particular 
level of IRR or MOIC at exit (Rimmer & SanAndres, 2012). Another way to compensate 
management upon exit is through a ratchet, a mechanism through which the equity 
stake hold by management varies depending on the performance of the management 
(Gilligan & Wright, 2014). Last but not least, Loos (Loos, 2005) found statistical 
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arguments to proof higher performance in LBOs where management was granted with 
10 to 20% of the target’s equity at the beginning of the transaction.  
 
On the other side, private equity funds do not hesitate to change the management 
team if deemed necessary to preserve the interests of the shareholders, especially 
during the initial phases of the LBO. Some researchers report that 52% of CEOs of 
participated companies were replaced out of a sample of 88 UK deals (Cornelli & 
Oguzhan, 2015). In another sample of 110 deals, Acharya, Hahn and Kehoe found that 
2 out of 3 top-performing deals had its CEO replaced at some point during the LBO 
(Acharya, Hahn, & Kehoe, 2009). This fact might raise the question of whether private 
equity managers are effective in aligning pre-LBO company managers’ interests with 
their own, or on the other side this effect comes only after new management teams are 
on-boarded by private equity managers.  
 
MBOs (Management Buy-Outs) are transactions through which the management of a 
company acquires the company they manage, or a significant stake of it. They can be 
considered as an extreme instance of management involvement in the governance of 
the firms. Mitto and Ng (Mitto & Ng, 2013) found differences in the incentives and 
market environment that trigger private-equity-backed LBOs, compared to MBOs, 
which suggests that, indeed, private equity investors and target managers have 
different views on the potential of the companies. 
 
No research has been found to argue that MBOs perform better or worse than LBOs. 
This is an argument in favour of the fact that the rationale of management incentives 
and downside sharing in LBOs is to align management of the firm going forward from 
the acquisition, rather than to take advantage of asymmetric information prior to closing 
the deal as the level of asymmetric information allegedly owned by managers does not 
seem to imply higher returns.  
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the alignment of managers’ interests through 




Letting aside the effect that debt has on boosting investor returns or the potential 
reductions in cost of capital, which will be elaborated in further detail in a dedicated 
section about leverage, high leverage is a two-edged sword in LBO-backed 
companies. While it induces obvious default risk into the company, it is said to have a 
positive effect on the decision-making of managers: debt discipline.  
 
Debt discipline refers to the fact that typical tight debt repayment schedules and tight 
financial covenants in LBO-backed companies encourage managers to be more 
cautious in spending the companies’ cash and work towards improving free cash flows. 
Financial covenants in LBOs will be studied in more detail in the section dedicated 
entirely to leverage as a way to align managers and shareholders’ interests with those 
of the debt providers. 
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Vernimmen, Quiry, Dalloccio and Salvi (Vernimmen, Quiry, Dallocchio , & Salvi, 2005)  
define the combination of management incentives and ownership, and deb discipline 
as a “carrot & stick” approach to ensure that management of the company is focused 
on achieving the value creation objectives of the private equity fund. The “carrot” would 
represent the possibility of upside sharing at exit, while the “stick” would refer to the 
pressure of complying with debt repayments and financial covenants.  
 
All in all, the combination of management incentives and ownership with the discipline 
effect of debt can be considered as a lever to achieve value creation in LBOs through 
the actions of the management.  
 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to quantify the amount of value created through specific 
management incentive and debt discipline schemes, or even to identify an optimal level 
of these incentives. Instead, it can be considered that managers add value in LBOs by 
improving the performance of the company, as elaborated bellow, and these incentives 
are the mechanisms put in place by the private equity fund managers to ensure that 
value is created through managerial action.  
Management action. Improving the performance of the target 
company  
 
Improvements in the operating performance of participated companies are probably the 
most evident value addition lever to measure for companies that go through LBO 
transactions.  
 
Company outperformance in LBOs comes essentially from three sources: operations 
engineering, strategic improvements and cash-flow improvements. These do not 
include financial engineering optimization through leverage as it will be entirely 
discussed in a dedicated section.  
 
Improving EBITDA: Operating performance improvements 
 
Improvements in the operations of the company have become a crucial source of value 
creation according to several authors, especially as the competition in the private 
equity industry has increased and debt markets have become more difficult to tap into 
than in early times before the credit crisis (Heel & Kehoe, 2005). It is usual nowadays 
that private equity investors involve an in-house operations team within their 
participated companies focused on achieving operational excellence (Hemptinne & 
Hoflack, 2009).   
 
Operating performance improvements are meant to have a direct impact on the 
operating margin or EBITDA by essentially improving the efficiency of the day-to-day 
activities of the company. Already in 1989, Bull found evidence that LBOs created 
value through operational improvements (Bull, 1989). While the strategic focus of the 
company is not changed, operational improvements might imply redistribution of the 
resources of the company (Berg & Gottschalg , 2003). These improvements refer 
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essentially to cost-efficiency and productivity-increasing efforts and affect therefore the 
cost side of the EBITDA calculation: 
 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑆𝐺&𝐴 − 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
Equation 1. EBITDA calculation 
EBITDA is often used as a proxy of the free cash flows of a company.   
 
While improvements in productivity can certainly influence the increase of revenues, for 
simplicity this paper will consider that revenue growth comes from strategic actions as 
this is usually the origin of revenue expansion.  
 
However, according to Mullin and Panas, LBO-backed company managers focus 
nowadays on revenue expanding activities, as cost reduction efforts are considered by 
many as a “commodity skill” (Mullin & Panas, 2014). 
 
In any case, it is clear that operating performance improvements have to be accounted 
for as a value creation lever in LBO deals.  
 
Creating a sustainable competitive advantage: Strategic improvements 
 
Strategic improvements are meant to create or boost sustainable competitive 
advantages for the business. Those usually have to do with strategic decisions such as 
what products to develop or what markets to compete in and how to improve the 
competitiveness of the business. Strategic improvements can be evaluated through a 
wide range of non-accounting KPIs, depending on the nature of the target company, 
and are meant to have a direct effect on revenue growth. 
The Ansoff matrix synthesises growth opportunities that companies can undertake at 
any stage of their life. It can be a good tool to assess growth opportunities in LBO-
backed companies.  
 
Figure 1. Ansoff Matrix 
According to Rogers, Holland and Haas, private equity investments that include 
strategic developments and growth opportunities in their investment thesis are more 
likely to be successful (Rogers, Holland , & Haas, 2002).  
 
An additional strategic development usually found in private equity backed companies 
has to do with corporate refocusing. Peripheral activities or those that do not create a 
clear competitive advantage are dismissed in order to redirect and focus the company 
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towards its core business (Berg & Gottschalg , 2003). Corporate refocusing is not 
conflictive with finding new areas of growth through new markets or products, as long 
as there is a clear strategic alignment with the core competences of the company 
across.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to secure strong valuations at exit, private equity funds need to 
make sure that their participated companies have a convincing growth story. After 
studying 839 LBO deals in France, Boucly, Srarer and Thesmar found out that LBO-
backed companies show faster growth than their comparable peers, not only in sales, 
but also in employment and, surprisingly, in CAPEX (Boucly, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2010). 
These findings are consistent with nowadays high valuations and the fact that 
operating improvements are considered by the markets as a given.  
 
LBO-backed companies do not only achieve growth organically. A widely-known 
strategy to achieve growth in LBO deals is the so-called “buy-and- build” strategy. In 
this case, a target company in a very particular segment or niche market is acquired 
with the goal to reach a dominant position in that segment and achieve economies of 
scale through subsequent acquisitions (Berg & Gottschalg , 2003). 
 
Last but not least, Baker and Montgomery found that private equity funds do not 
usually foster horizontal synergies across companies participated by the same fund 
(Baker & Montgomery, 1994). Achieving cross company synergies definitively looks 
like a value creation scope that private equity funds should care more about.  
 
More and more should private equity managers care about strategic improvements and 
growth opportunities in order to create value in LBOs. 
 
Improving the cash-flows. Capex and Working Capital management 
 
Improvements in cash-flows are essential to effectively meet debt repayment 
schedules and to be able to invest in growth opportunities. In LBO-backed companies 
and beyond EBIDTDA improvements, cash-flows are essentially increased through 
improvements in CAPEX, managing working capital more efficiently and sometimes 
through asset disposals.  
 
Target company managers impose strict CAPEX regimes, which is translated into 
cutting unclear investments. Some improvements in CAPEX might come in hand with 
operational improvements, for instance, those that have to do with maintenance 
expenditures of obsolete or misused assets.  
 
Working capital management improvement is essential to manage the timing of 
available cash. LBO-backed companies usually show lower levels of working capital 
than their peers (Scavolo, 2016). 
 
Asset disposals refer to the fact that private-equity backed companies might be willing 
to sell underperforming assets in order to improve their cash-flow availability.  Strict 
CAPEX management policies and asset disposals are often accused of being value-
destructive in LBO-backed companies and to only produce short term advantages 
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(Scavolo, 2016). In applying these initiatives, managers should be careful not to 
compromise competitive advantage and future growth opportunities. 
 
Cash-flow improvements are an essential value creation lever in LBOs as they allow 
for a healthier company that can deal with debt repayments and invest in growth 
projects. 
Leverage & Capital Structure 
 
The rationale of high leverage for the Private Equity fund 
 
The most controversial characteristic of LBO deals is the typical highly leveraged 
capital structure. The amount of debt used in an LBO deal varies extensively across 
deals, it is highly dependent on the credit markets conditions (Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2008) and it can range between 50 and 90% of the target’s purchase price (Talmor & 
Vasvari, 2011).  
 
From a sample of 501 LBO deals in the US, Liu found evidence of higher industry-
adjusted returns in deals with larger quantity of debt (Liu, 2013). It can be therefore 
argued that high leverage is a value creation lever for shareholders in LBO deals.  
 
Besides the discipline effect of debt mentioned earlier in this paper, the motivations for 
private equity funds to use these large amounts of leverage in LBO deals can be 
summarized into the two following: Boost the return on the equity invested through the 
repayment of debt and reduce risk exposure by distributing risk throughout debt 
providers.  
 
The following chart reflects in a simplified way the boosting effect of leverage on the 
equity value of the target company. Assuming a constant enterprise value, debt 
repayment between entry and exit will improve the value of the equity of the company.  
 
 
Figure 2. Boosting equity value through debt repayment. Source: Own analysis 
The immediate effect is an improvement of IRR and capital gains or Multiple On 













Debt also allows for a distribution of the business risk of the target throughout the debt 
providers and across different levels of risk preferences. In case of default by a 
participated company, the potential downside assumed by the private equity fund is 
limited to its equity contribution. Additionally, the exposure of one company of the 
overall fund to one single company or industry is diminished by reducing the required 
investment and allowing further investments by the fund in other companies. 
 
In any case, high leverage can be considered a value creation lever for the 
shareholders that tap into the credit markets both to boost returns and to spread risk. 
Next section will elaborate further on the effect of debt on the capital structure of the 
company.   
 
Does the company benefit from debt arbitrage? 
 
The credit market, typical LBO debt instruments and the WACC 
 
Private equity funds use their financial expertise to optimize the capital structure of the 
companies they acquire and tap into their networks within the financial industry (Kaplan 
& Strömberg, 2008) and even create competition among financing banks or investors 
(Loos, 2005), in order to achieve the most attractive credit conditions available.  
 
Numerous researchers have demonstrated the cyclicality of the private equity industry 
due to its tight dependence on the credit market and define it as a “boom and bust” 
industry (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008) (Acharya, Franks, & Servaes, 2007). Credit 
markets affect private equity deals in three main ways: number of deals, target 
valuations and prices (Axelson , Jenkinson, Strömberg, & Weisbach, 2007) and the 
amount of leverage used to acquire the target. Low interest rates and favourable credit 
markets in general generate an increase in the number of deals, increase in company 
valuations and increase in the leverage used to finance the deals.  
 
The following chart from 2016 Bain & Company’s Global Private Equity clearly shows 
the cyclical nature of the buyout activity both in deal value and deal count (Bain & 
Company, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 3. 1995 - 2015 Global Buyout activity. Source: (Bain & Company, 2016) 
 15 
It clearly shows how private equity activity increased substantially due to the high 
liquidity of the credit market in the years prior to the credit crisis of 2008, and fell 
substantially right afterwards. Recent favourable credit conditions in the past years 
have resulted again in an increase in buyout activity, even though not so exaggerated 
as before the crisis. These results support the hypothesis that private equity funds tap 
into arbitrage opportunities between debt and equity markets to finance their deals 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008).  
 
Debt providers in LBO transactions include traditional banks and institutional investors 
such as hedge funds, pension funds, collateralized debt obligation investors and 
specialized credit funds. The issuance of debt through such a complex structure often 
requires the participation of an investment bank and syndication of lenders 
(Vernimmen, Quiry, Dallocchio , & Salvi, 2005), (Talmor & Vasvari, 2011). 
 
The typical debt structure in an LBO deal involves different tranches of seniority, i.e., 
different levels of priority to receive the cash-flows of the company when repaying debt.  
The most characteristic types of debt are, by order of seniority, the followings: Senior 
Term Debt, which can be further divided into different seniorities (A, B, C, D…); Junior 
or Subordinated debt, a.k.a. high yield debt; and Mezzanine. Moreover, LBO-backed 
companies have also access to revolving credit. Finally, some LBOs also include 




























The following table summarizes the most relevant characteristics of the different debt 









 Main Characteristics 
Revolving Credit 




LIBOR + 100 





- Credit spread function of current 
assets, financial performance and 
risk measures 
- Used to finance Working Capital, 
CAPEX and temporal cash deficits 
- Usually secured by inventory and 
A/R. 
Senior Term Debt 
7 to 9 years 
 




Senior Loan B: 








Senior A + 
25-50 bps 
- Credit spread function of fair 
market and liquidation value of 
assets 
- Usually involves constraints such 
as early repayment in case of 
excess cash; no dividends to 
shareholders… 













LIBOR + 800 
- 1200 bps 
 
Cash or PIK 
interests 
- Credit spreads function of cash-
flows 
- Not secured 
- Usually rated as non-investing/high 
yield debt 
Mezzanine 














cash and half 
PIK 
- Credit spreads function of cash-
flows 
- Not secured 
- Includes upside participation 
through convertibility option or 
participation pay-out, so to reach 
higher returns (target: 14%-18% 
p.a.) 
- Mezzanine investors usually ask for 
participation in the board 




- Increases tax-shield and reduces 
tax on capital gains 
- Implies increase in share of 
Management equity 
Figure 4. Different debt instruments in LBOs and their main characteristics. Sources: Own analysis, 
(Talmor & Vasvari, 2011) (Vernimmen, Quiry, Dallocchio , & Salvi, 2005) 
 
 
                                               
1
 Illustrative values, to represent the difference across different debt instruments. Real interest 
level depends on the state of the credit market 
2 
Interests are marketed as floating rates but lenders will usually ask the company to swap to 
fixed rates to hedge against credit risk  
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The following chart represents the typical debt structure in an LBO-backed company. 
   
 
Figure 5. Typical debt structure in an LBO-Backed company. Source: Own analysis 
The expertise by private equity funds in the use of credit instruments is supposed to 
reduce the cost of capital of the target companies as defined by the calculation of the 
WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital): 
 







Equation 2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
Indeed, increasing the use of debt (D) should lower the WACC as the cost of debt (rD) 
is by definition lower than the cost of equity (rE), to compensate for different level of 
risk. Furthermore, as explained in next section, the tax deductibility of interests should 
also drive WACC down in LBOs.  
 
Nevertheless, while practitioners seem convinced that private equity funds are able to 
optimize the capital structure of their targets through the use of debt (Berg & 
Gottschalg , 2003), this result challenges the Modigliani Miller theory. Indeed, the high 
use of leverage in LBOs implies an increased risk of financial distress, which is 
reflected in a higher cost of debt compared to peers (Berg & Gottschalg , 2003). 
However, the fact that the existing debt of the company is usually refinanced upon 
acquisition is an argument in favour of the fund being able to reduce the cost of capital 
for the company through the LBO. On the other side though, financial distress costs 
can affect the competitiveness of the company in the long term as it limits its access to 
future financing.   
 
All in all, it is difficult to reach a consensus about whether the financing practices in 
LBOs benefit the target company besides being highly beneficial for the private equity 














Debt & Equity Debt
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Tax deductibility of interests 
 
In most countries, interest expenses are tax deductible. This creates per force a 
positive effect in the bottom line of the target company by creating a tax shield that 
reduces the taxes payed. Some researchers argue that the tax benefits in LBOs have 
accounted historically for between 10% and 20% of the firm’s value, but have 
decreased in the recent years due to lower corporate taxes and use of leverage 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008). 
 
While tax deductibility of interests is supposed to have a direct positive effect on the 
cost of capital of the target companies, some researchers suggest that it does not 
depend on leverage since the higher cost of riskier debt counterweights the effect of 
tax shield benefits (Loos, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, besides the potential positive impact in the bottom line of the company, 
some researchers suggest that tax shield effects are already reflected in the price paid 
for the target company as the LBO debt levels are defined pre-acquisition and 
therefore do not create additional value for the private equity funds (Knauer, Lahmann, 
& Schwetzler, 2014).  
 
In some jurisdictions, LBO-backed companies might also benefit from tax loss carry 
forwards, which allow companies to deduct future tax payments if they declare financial 
losses.  
 
Another important aspect in some jurisdictions is the possibility of fiscal integration. For 
instance, in the case of France, if more than 95% of a target company is acquired, 
taxes are only payable at the holding company level. In the case of an LBO, interest 
expenses at the level of the holding company become then tax deductible.  
 
Finally, further tax benefits in LBO deals might have to do with the legal structure of the 
deal. 
 
Agency theory. Debt providers and financial covenants 
 
In this section, the assumption will be made that the interests of shareholders and 
managers are aligned versus the interests of the debtholders, therefore creating a 
potential agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders. In reality, financial 
covenants are a key piece in the alignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers through the discipline effect of debt. However, managers share part of 
shareholders’ upside, while they do not necessarily take part on the decisions about 
the leverage of the LBO deal. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that they will be 
aligned with shareholders’ interests in a potential conflict of interests against the debt 
providers.  
 
Private equity investors have an incentive to maximize the leverage of target 
companies in other to boost their IRR and share default risk. Finally, limited liability 
also protects shareholders through the legal structure of the LBO deal in case of 
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default as the debt is mainly secured by the assets and cash-flows of the target 
company.  
 
These findings are consistent with the view that private equity shareholders will aim at 
borrowing as much as possible. Hence, some researchers suggest that it corresponds 
to credit markets and debt providers to provide discipline to LBO companies by limiting 
the amount of debt to be lent (Axelson , Jenkinson, Strömberg, & Weisbach, 2007) and 
monitoring the companies through debt covenants (Tappeiner, 2010).  
 
Debt covenants are clauses written in the debt contracts that limit potential 
opportunistic actions of shareholders and managers that could decrease the value of 
debt (Tappeiner, 2010). While the existence of covenants might theoretically limit value 
creation opportunities for the company and shareholders, research suggests that 
private equity investments have higher returns with tighter debt covenants (Liu, 2013). 
 
More conspicuously, there are mainly two kinds of debt covenants: action-restricting 
covenants and financial covenants (Tappeiner, 2010). Action restricting covenants aim 
at limiting managerial actions such rising more senior debt than the current outstanding 
debt or limit the scope of projects managers can invest available cash in. On the other 
side, financial covenants are aimed at controlling the performance of the company 
through ratios that relate the debt burden of the company with operating performance 
(Tappeiner, 2010). Breaching a financial covenant implies that the company is 
technically in default and gives control rights to the debtholders. The following table 
summarizes the most typical financial covenants in LBOs. 
 




 3x-6x  





 1.1x-1.2x  
Interest Coverage Ratio 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
 3x-4x  
Figure 6. Typical financial covenants in LBOs. Source: (Tappeiner, 2010) and own analysis. 
Some researchers already suggested before the financial crisis that increased 
involvement of institutional debt investors in LBO deals in detriment of banks, as well 
as the increasing trend of debt syndication was causing less restrictive borrower 
monitoring, which could result in excessive lending, higher risk of default and lower 
recovery rates (Acharya, Franks, & Servaes, 2007). 
 
In summary, the resolution of the agent-principal problem between shareholders and 
debt providers by using debt covenants is key to enable the use of debt for LBO deals. 
Furthermore, as discussed in previous sections, they are key on inducing a debt 
discipline effect on managers.  
 
                                               
3 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
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Externalities of LBOs  
 
The main claims against LBO deals have to do with short-termism and drastic cost-
cutting by private equity funds on target companies. This section aims at exploring the 
state of literature regarding externalities of LBOs in three different areas that do not 
necessarily align with the interests of private equity shareholders: Employment, 




It is easy to understand why company employees usually fear LBO investors. One of 
the most sounded cost-cutting buckets to be considered when undergoing cost 
restructuring in a company is usually human capital.    
 
Nevertheless, several researchers seem to contradict this intuition. Boucly, Sraer and 
Thesmar found evidence across 839 LBO deals in France of strong employment 
growth in target companies after an LBO, particularly of 18% in the four years after the 
deal (Boucly, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2010).  
 
Capizzi and Giovannini also find statistical correlation between job-creation and the 
presence of a private equity investor across 2,450 deals occurred between 2002 and 
2011, especially in those firms that are more profitable (Capizzi, Giovannini, & Pesic).  
 
Ames and Wright, not only do not find evidence of job destruction in LBO-backed 
companies, but also warn that “in terms of employment, LBO might be considered a 
more favourable corporate restructuring transaction compared with takeovers” (Amess 
& Wright, Leveraged buyouts, private equity and jobs, 2010). 
 
All in all, it looks like statistically LBOs not only do not destroy jobs, but create them. In 
any case, the affectation of an LBO deal on the workers of the target company would 




Given the long term and difficult-to-realize nature of R&D and innovation related 
expenditures, it is a widely spread believe that the relatively short-term investment 
horizon and cost-cutting efforts negatively affect innovation within participated 
companies.  
 
First, private equity funds do not usually invest in highly-tech, innovation-focused 
businesses as these are usually risky business that require long-term investments and 
are not suitable for debt financing (Torres, 2015).  
 
One should bear in mind that private equity funds’ goals are to invest in companies to 
increase their value. However, as stated earlier, cost-cutting is more and more not 
enough to create substantial value for LBO-companies and instead. On the other side, 
revenue prospects and growth opportunities are priced at exit valuations. Therefore, it 
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looks like private equity funds should not aim at irrationally cutting expenses in key 
areas that can involve future growth prospects for the company, such as R&D.  
 
Some researchers found evidence that private equity investors do not jeopardize 
innovation across their participated companies. In their study on a sample of 89 
manufacturing companies from France, Le Nadant and Perdreau differentiate between 
different types of innovation: product, process, organizational, marketing and patents 
and other protecting mechanisms (Le Nadant & Pedreau, 2012). While they found no 
evident differences in innovation expenditures between LBO companies and peers, 
they find substantial service and marketing-related innovations. Those innovation 
efforts seem driven by the ambition to increase revenue streams fostered by 
improvements in corporate governance as they built upon existing capabilities instead 
of introducing new skills.  
 
On the other side, after studying 407 LBO deals in the UK, Amess, Stiebale and Wright 
concluded that LBOs have a positive causal effect on the production of innovation as 
their results indicate a “6% increase in quality-adjusted patent stock three years after 
the deal”. They argue that access to external sources of financing through the 
involvement of private equity funds allows financially constrained companies to invest 
in innovative projects (Amess, Stiebale, & Wright, The impact of private equity on firms' 
innovation activity, 2015). 
 
In summary, private equity backed companies should not be accused of being 
innovation destructive. On one side, business needs push managers to innovate in 
business practices. On the other side, private equity investors know that destroying 
sources of potential future growth will impact negatively future valuations of the 
company.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The European Commission defined CSR as “The responsibility of enterprises for their 
impacts in Society” (European Commission, 2011). CSR practices involve the 
integration of “social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into 
the business operations and core strategy” of any company (European Commission, 
2011) . 
 
Nowadays it seems unthinkable that private equity investors might compromise any 
CSR practice from target companies in the name of cost-cutting. In today’s 
interconnected world, it is very easy to earn a reputation for CSR bad practices and 
very difficult to correct it. Moreover, investors are every time more sustainability-
conscious and require investment funds to watch out for CSR compliance. This is 
practice is named as Socially Responsible Investment and implies that investors 
consider social and environmental consequences of their investments at the same 
level of financial analysis (Social Investment Forum, 2003).  
 
Private equity funds take CSR seriously, despite the private nature of their 
investments, particularly when an IPO is considered as a potential exit strategy. Some 
research suggests that private equity funds actually undertake CSR actions to the 
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extent that it helps increase the value of the company, either via shareholder 
engagement or via actual improvements on the bottom line of the company (Forget, 
2012).  
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Value creation levers and their KPIs 
 
The following table aims at providing an answer to the question: What are the levers at 
the reach of every stake holder to create value through an LBO, and how can it be 
measured? It summarizes the value creation levers that have been identified for each 
stakeholder, along with some relevant KPIs that will be utilized during the case study to 
evaluate how the private equity fund is tapping into each of the levers. 
 
Source Lever KPIs4 
Private 
Equity Fund 










































Other performance ratios, specific to the target 












∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠⌋𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ; % 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 
Organic and inorganic revenue growth 











Cost of capital 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐾𝑑 
Tax shield 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
















CSR 𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
Figure 7. Value creation levers by each stakeholder and their KPIs. Source: Own analysis  
                                               
4 
As important as finding the proper KPI is to find proper benchmarks such as comparable 
companies, comparable deals, historic values and forecasts. Industry adjustment is necessary.  
5 
It can be assumed that managers create value through improving the company’s performance 
6
 Refers to the levels set by the debtholders of the main covenants, to evaluate how restrictive 
they are compared to other deals 
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Part II. Measuring value earned by the 
different stakeholders 
Quantifying the value earned by the shareholders 
 
Internal Rate of Return, Multiple on Invested Cash and Profitability Index 
 
The value earned throughout an LBO for shareholders can be defined as the cash-
flows they earn from their investment. It is quantified as the difference in equity value 
owned by them between acquisition and exit. More conspicuously, it is defined by the 
following equation: 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 
Equation 3. Shareholder value created 
Where Equity Value is calculated using a multiple-based approach: 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = (
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
) ×  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
Equation 4. Equity Value calculation 
And where the multiple (
Entreprise Value 
EBITDA
) is based on market valuation and negotiation 
by the private equity fund. 
 
There are two main metrics that private equity investors use to refer to value creation 
through their investments: The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and the Multiple on 
Invested Capital (MoIC). 
 
The IRR calculates the return on the investment, considering the time-value of money: 
As a result, the IRR equals to the annualized rate of return, no matter the length of the 
investment. It is mathematically defined as the rate of return that will make the NPV of 
the investment equal to zero: 






Equation 5. IRR calculation 
Where the term Cash-flows takes into account any cash proceeds from and to the 
investors, i.e., the equity invested at entry, potential reinvestments during the life of the 
LBO, equity proceeds at exit and dividend pay-outs, if any. For private equity 
investments, where usually neither dividend proceeds nor equity reinvestments are 
planned ex-ante, the IRR can be directly calculated as follows: 







Equation 6. Typical IRR calculation for private equity investments 
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Where t represents the holding period. This formula is equivalent to the CAGR 
calculation of equity and will be useful to decompose the IRR into different value 
creation parameters.  
 
On the other side, MoIC is calculated as the ratio of the exit proceeds to the entry 
investment.  
𝑀𝑜𝐼𝐶 =  
∑ 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦




Equation 7. MoIC calculation 
The MoIC is also known as the Cash-on-Cash (CoC) multiple and it does not take into 
account the time value of money. It is widely used to get a quick glimpse of the 
performance of the investment. However, its use is not advisable as a standalone 
indicator as it can deliver misleading interpretations. A very graphic example is as 
follows: in two investments with the same IRR, but different MoIC, the one with a 
higher MoIC will necessarily be an investment with a longer investment period. 
However, this later investment would not include the illiquidity premium to compensate 
the investor for a longer holding period. Assuming that there is a cost of opportunity 
that incentivizes investors to prefer shorter term investments, a rational investor would 
choose the investment with the lowest MoIC. It can be extracted from here that IRR 
allows investors to compare between investments with different time horizons.  
 
However, IRR does have some drawbacks as an indicator of value creation for 
shareholders. First of all, due to its mathematical definition, the calculation of the IRR 
can deliver contradicting results to the simple examination of the NPV in the case of 
investments that combine positive and negative cash-flows. Second, the calculation of 
IRR assumes a constant discount rate along the investment period, which is not 
necessarily true for sophisticated investors. Finally, the IRR standalone does not 
consider the cost of capital for shareholders. For that matter, IRR has to be used in 
comparison to a benchmark. In the case of LBOs, usually funds set a target IRR they 
expect to achieve throughout an investment.            
 
To solve these issues of IRR, Gottschalg, Loos and Zollo propose an alternative ratio: 
the profitability Index (Gottschalg, Zollo, & Loos, 2004). The profitability index is 
calculated as the ratio between the NPV of an investment and the amount of money 
invested.  
 




Equation 8. Profitability Index calculation 
The calculation of the profitability index allows the investor to use the discount rate that 
suits best his or her risk profile and compare it with a default alternative investment. A 
PI greater than one will mean that the investment is attractive.  
 
For simplicity, the GPs and the LPs will be considered within the same group of 
shareholders, even though in reality the GP earns fees out of the return from the LPs. 
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Disaggregation of the Internal Rate of Return 
 
Method 1: Academic Approach 
 
Loos proposed a method to decompose the IRR into the main factors of the equity 
value calculation: The Multiple, the EBITDA and the Net Debt. EBITDA can actually be 
decomposed further into the revenue effect and the margin effect: 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = (
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
) ×  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ×  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
Equation 9. Equity value equation 
The method proposed by Loos is based on the calculation of the IRR as the CAGR of 
the equity value between exit and entry7. It uses the Dupont formula on the calculation 












Equation 10. Dupond RoE decomposition in 3 steps  
Assets can be substituted by the Enterprise Value: 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
 













Let’s now eliminate the net income from the equation and incorporate EBITDA: 
 











And apply the calculation of the CAGR to account for the growth of the different factors, 
where 1 + CAGR(Equity) equals to 1 + IRR(Equity): 
 
1 + 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅(𝐸𝑞𝑉) = [1 + 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅(𝑅𝑒𝑣)] × [1 + 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅(
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑅𝑒𝑣
)] × [1 + 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅(
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴





The natural logarithm can be applied to transform the multiplication into a sum. 





















In the previous equation, the four effects have already been differentiated, as follows: 
                                               
7
 Therefore assumes no dividends or reinvestments, i.e., the only cash-flows for investors are 
equity invested at entry and equity perceived at exit. 
8 EqV = Equity Value; Rev = Revenues; EV = Enterprise Value 
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- EBITDA Margin Effect 






- Multiple Expansion Effect 
 






- Leverage Effect 






The following equation represents how the four effects are going to relatively add up to 
the entire IRR: 
 























Equation 11. IRR decomposition into the four effects: Revenue, EBITDA margin, Multiple expansion and 
Leverage  
Indeed, this method will allow for an attribution of the value created represented by the 
IRR to the four different effects. The main drawback of this method is that it can only be 
utilised when the only cash-flows in the investment are the equity investment at entry 
and the equity proceeds at exit, as it could happen in the case of an IPO. 
 
Method 2: Practitioner approach 
 
Practitioners use a simpler and more intuitive approach to disaggregate the IRR into 
different factors. One example of such approach is described by Goedhart, Levy, and 
Morgan (Goedhart, Levy, & Morgan, 2015). From the example illustrated in this article, 
one can subtract a general method, which would be as follows: 
 
First of all, it is necessary to differentiate between the unlevered IRR and the levered 
IRR. The unlevered IRR accounts for the cash-flows that the investors would earn if the 
deal was carried out at 100% equity, i.e., thanks to the improved cash-flow generation 
by the company.  
0 =  ∑





Equation 12. Unlevered IRR  
The levered cash-flows represent the actual cash-flows along the holding period. 
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0 =  ∑





Equation 13. Levered IRR  
Then, the unlevered IRR can be decomposed into the following different contribution 
factors and gains. Each factor’s gain is calculated as follows: 
 
- Capital gains due to improved business performance, i.e., EBITDA 
 







- Capital gains due to multiple expansion 
 












The unlevered return, expressed in cash gains, can be calculated as the sum of the 
present value of the previous factors. Therefore, one can calculate the attribution of 
each factor to the unlevered IRR by calculating the fraction of each factor compared to 
the total unlevered return. 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =   𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 
Equation 14. Unlevered Return 
Finally, the leverage effect is the difference between the unlevered IRR and the levered 
IRR: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =  𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑙 − 𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑢 
Equation 15. Leverage effect  
It is interesting to note that this methodology is very useful as it can allow further 
breakdown of the different factors, depending on the needs of study, as will happen in 
the case study at the end of this paper. For instance, business performance 
improvement can be broken down into the effects of organic growth, margin increase 
or cost reductions.  
Quantifying the value earned by the target company 
 
Return on Equity 
 
RoE can be interpreted as the performance, from the company point of view, in 
transforming equity into profits compared to the cost of equity. In other words, RoE is 
an accounting ratio aimed at assessing the profitability of the company. It is calculated 
as follows: 
 




Equation 16. Return on Equity  
 29 
Even though many investors focus on RoE to assess the returns on their investments, 
RoE should be kept as a company profitability measure only for the various reasons. 
First of all, company’s net profits do not necessarily translate into shareholder. 
Secondly, RoE is a periodic measure and short term ratio, i.e., it measures the 
profitability of the company during one particular period, normally one year. However, 
over the course of an LBO investment, profits over a good year can be jeopardized by 
losses in bad years or wrongful investment policies of retained earnings. Loos refers to 
RoE as the “static” return on equity, as opposed to the “dynamic equity appreciation 
between entry and exit” (Loos, 2005), which does reflect the interests of shareholders. 
In a third place, RoE is calculated after accounting for the cost of debt, but before 
taking into account the cost of equity. Therefore, it has to be used in comparison with a 
benchmark that reflects the cost of equity for the company. 
Another issue with RoE is that it can be artificially inflated by increasing the gearing of 
the company:  




Equation 17. Return on Equity as function of leverage 
Indeed, as far as interests after taxes are lower than the Return on Capital Employed 
(Return of Economic Assets), a higher leverage (
𝐷
𝐸
) artificially improves RoE. This can 
be considered a strong argument against the use of RoE in evaluating value creation 
for the company in LBOs due to the usual high leverage in such deals. This is the 
reason why some academics argue that the persecution of an ever-higher RoE can 
lead to value destruction (de Wet & du Toit, 2006).   
 
Return on Capital Employed or Return on Invested Capital 
 
Return on Capital Employed (RoCE) and Return on Invested capital (RoIC) are two 
accounting profitability ratios that can be said to be two sides of the same coin. On one 
side, RoCE measures the efficiency capital is used in the company with, by comparing 
the operating income of a company after tax with the capital employed. On the other 
side, RoIC uses capital investment. They are calculated as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐶𝐸 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ×  (1 − 𝑡)
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
 
Equation 18. Return on Capital Employed  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
Equation 19. Capital Employed  
𝑅𝑜𝐼𝐶 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ×  (1 − 𝑡)
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 
Equation 20. Return on Capital Invested  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
Equation 21. Capital Invested  




𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 
Equation 22. Identity between Capital Employed and Capital Invested  
Therefore, RoIC should be equal to RoCE. 
 
The main advantage of calculating RoCE over the RoE of a company is that it takes 
into account the debt used to finance the operations of the company. Hence, it reflects 
more neatly the ability of the company to transform capital into profits. RoCE is directly 
comparable with the Cost of Capital of the company, or WACC. Indeed, WACC is 
properly used as a benchmark against RoCE, by calculating the spread RoCE – 
WACC to assess the ability of a company to create value beyond its cost of capital.  
 
RoCE can be easily decomposed as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐶𝐸 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 × (1 − 𝑡)
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
=






Equation 23. RoCE decomposition  
Where: 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 ×  (1 − 𝑡)
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
Equation 24. Operating margin after tax  




Equation 25. Capital Employed Turnover  
Economic Value Added and Market Value Added 
 
Economic Value Added (EVA) is a performance measure developed by Stern Stewart 
& Co that claims to calculate the true economic profit of a company by comparing the 
profitability of the company with its cost of capital. It can essentially be calculated as 
the multiplying the spread between a profitability ratio (RoCE, RoIC…) and the 
company’s cost of capital by the economic asset this profitability refers to: 
 
EVA = (RoCE − WACC) × Capital Employed 
EVA = (RoIC − WACC) × Capital Invested 
Equation 26. Economic Value Added  
Alternatively, EVA can be calculated as follows: 
 
EVA = EBIT ×  (1 − t) − WACC × Capital Employed 
Equation 27. Economic Value Added alternative calculation 
Some detractors of EVA argue that it is still a short-term measure, as it only focuses on 
the results over one period, as well as any other accounting ratio. This could lead to 
the rejection of projects with negative EVA in early periods (de Wet & du Toit, 2006). 
 
Alternatively, the calculation of the Market Value Added reflects the value created by a 
company over a period, as the difference between the market value of the company 
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prospectively achieved and the capital invested. It can be calculated as the present 
value of the expected EVA: 






Equation 28. Market Value Added 
Where r can be the discount rate selected by investors to evaluate the investment 
based on their risk profile. 
Quantifying the value earned by the Managers 
  
It is very difficult to evaluate the value earned by the management team during the 
LBO. First of all, the value that the management team can take out from the deal can 
be based on many more dimensions than just the economic one. For the sake of 
simplicity, this thesis is only going to focus on the economic value. 
 
As elaborated in the previous section about management incentives in LBOs, the 
economic value earned by managers throughout an LBO is going to depend on the 
particular conditions of each deal and can be split into three main components: the 
base salary, the variable salary linked to company performance and the participation of 
the management into the equity of the target company, both through their own capital 
or through compensation schemes.  
Quantifying the value earned by the debt providers 
 
The value created for debt investors can be evaluated as the IRR for every debt 
tranche in the LBO deal.  
 
The calculation of the IRR of debt will depend on the characteristics of every tranche. If 
the cash interests are paid periodically, as it is common for senior term debt, the IRR of 
the debt tranche i can be calculated as follows: 
 







Equation 29. Internal Rate of Return of Debt with periodic interest payments  
Where the term Cash-flows includes interest payments and the repayment of the 
principal both at maturity and during the investment period if the debt is amortized. 
 
For tranches that do not require periodic cash interests, as it is typical in mezzanine, 
the IRR of the debt can be calculated at maturity as follows: 
𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖







Equation 30. Internal Rate of Return of Debt without periodic interest payments  
 32 
The value of debt at exit includes the accrued interest paid in kind, as well as any other 
capital gains by the debt investors earned through participation clauses such as 
convertibility options or participation pay-out (Silbernagel & Vaitkunas). In any case, 
provided that the company does not fail to fulfil its debt obligations, the IRR earned by 
the debtholders should be equal to the annual interest for each tranche of debt.  
 
As a benchmark, the calculation of the cost of debt is required for every different debt 
investor. Ideally, every tranche should be rated to be compared with the yield of 





Part III. Case Study: Applus+ 
 
The Company: Applus+ in 2007 
 
In July 2007, The Carlyle Group (Carlyle) published a press release where it described 
Applus+, the company they had just acquired as “The leader in inspection, certification, 
testing and technological services in Spain” (The Carlyle Group, 2007). Nowadays, 
Applus+ is “a world leader TIC9 Company that provides its services for the energy, 
industrial, infrastructure and automotive sectors” (Applus+, 2014). Applus+ is 
headquartered in Barcelona, Spain.  
 
Applus+ has its origins in the creation of AgBar Automotive business in 1996, by The 
AgBar Group (“Aguas de Barcelona”), the provider of water distribution services and 
treatment in Barcelona. Agbar Automotive was the result of the separation of the 
Statutory Vehicle Inspection business (ITV, “Inspección Técnica de Vehículos”, in 
Spanish) from the core business of the group. By the end of 1996, Agbar automotive 
had already acquired eight ITV concessions in Spain and aimed at becoming a leader 
in the vehicle inspection following the privatization of the sector in Spain. In 1997, it 
already owned concessions in other countries such as Portugal, Argentina and Costa 
Rica (Nueva Economia, 2000). 
 
In 1999, Agbar Automotive Group acquired 80% of IDIADA, a spin-off from the 
Polytechnic University of Catalonia. IDIADA owned several first-level laboratories, 
facilities and more than 300 engineers and experts in the field of vehicle testing and 
engineering.  
  
In 2002, the company’s strategy was redefined and globalized, and the company was 
rebranded as Applus+. 
 
In 2003, Applus+ entered a long-term contract with the Catalan government to manage 
the LGAI (“Laboratori General d'Assaigs i Investigacions”), a set of, at that time, seven 
laboratories aimed at providing technological support to industrial enterprises through 
testing, calibration and R&D. This acquisition was key to underpin the basis for further 
technological expansion in the business of testing and certification. In 2012, the LGAI 
was rebranded as Applus+ Laboratories.  
 
In the subsequent years, Applus+ demonstrated an impressive growth, both organically 
and through acquisitions. In 2004, it achieved €213 in revenues, 30% of which coming 
from international business. That same year, Applus+ acquired Soluziona Calidad y 
Medioambiente, the business of quality and environment previously owned by 
Soluziona, to become the biggest provider of industrial and environmental inspection 
and technical assistance in Spain.  
                                               
9
 TIC: Testing, Inspection and Certification 
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In 2005, Applus+ acquired Bilsyn, a Danish public provider of vehicle inspection and in 
2006; it acquired K1, the second biggest Finish operator of vehicle inspections.  
 
Also in 2006, Applus+ acquired Röntgen Technische Dienst (RTD), the leader of non-
destructive tests in the oil and gas industry, consequently becoming a leader in the 
industry. By the end of 2006, Applus+ had revenues of €537m and business in over 40 
countries worldwide. 
 
In 2007 Carlyle led the €1.48bn Leveraged Buyout of Applus+ which is the subject of 
this case study. At the time of acquisition, Applus+ employed more than 8,500 
employees and its activities were divided into four differentiated business lines:  
 
Statutory Vehicle Inspections 
 
Applus+ was the second largest company in the vehicle inspections sector in Europe. 
Through this line, Applus+ provided technical inspection of safety and emissions in 
vehicles to comply with regulatory standards in jurisdictions where such periodic 
inspections are mandatory. This line represented 50% of Applus+’s revenues, 80% of 
which came from public concession agreements.  
 
Engineering, testing and certification 
 
Applus+ provided testing services, analysis and homologation, and certifications such 
as ISO both to oil and gas and industrial companies through its LGAI labs, as well as to 
automotive manufacturers through IDIADA.   
 
Inspection and technical assistance 
 
Through this business line, dominated by the acquisition of Soluziona Calidad y 
Medioambiente, Applus+ provided a broad range of supervision, technical assistance, 
inspection and testing services, as well as project management and consulting 
services, related to electricity and telecommunications networks, industrial facilities and 




Through its recently acquired subsidiary RTD, Applus+ provided non-destructive tests 
(NDT) services to companies in the oil and gas industry. NDT allow the testing of 
assets and materials without affecting their functionality. 
 
The following figure summarizes the structure of the company right before the LBO, 
which does not reflect the ownership and legal structures. 
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Figure 8. Organizational structure of Applus+ in 2006. Source: Own analysis 
The Industry: Testing, Inspection and certification (TIC)  
 
The TIC industry comprises a wide range of services such as advisory, inspection, 
testing, verification, certification and audit that aim at addressing the performance and 
conformity of products, industrial assets or systems so that clients are sure to meet 
specific quality, health, safety and environmental (QHSE) requirements. These TIC 
services can be basically driven by three factors: regulatory requirements, industry 
specific or internationally recognised standards and proprietary requirements, i.e., 
based on the demand of the client.  
 
According to various reports, the worldwide TIC market had a size of more than 
€100bn in 2013 and is expected to grow 5% annually until 2022 (Market Research 
Future, 2017).  
 
TIC services are provided either in-house (60% of the market) or by external TIC 
services companies, such as Applus+, which consist of a very fragmented 40% of the 
market. The following chart provides a further segmentation of the TIC market, where 
services to industries clearly dominate the market with 53% of share compared to only 
9% of consumer testing. 
 
 
























The TIC market can be described as a fragmented market with high barriers of entry. 
The market is mainly represented by small companies that offer very specific TIC 
services with a local scope. There are four companies that can be considered as 
international players in this market, from which they control c. 13% of the total market 
share altogether (Banco Portugués de Investismento, 2014). These international 




SGS, formerly Société Générale de Surveillance, was founded in 1878 in Rouen, in 
France. It defines itself as “the world leading inspection, verification, testing and 
Certification Company”. SGS is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, went public on 
the SIX Swiss Exchange in 1981 and is part of the Swiss Market Index since 1985. It 
counts on more than 90,000 employees and a network of more than 2,000 offices. It 
ranked Forbes 200 in 2015 and 2016. In 2013, it had a 4.7% market share.  
 
Bureau Veritas      
 
Bureau Veritas was founded in 1828 in Antwerp, Belgium. It defines itself as “a global 
leader in Testing, Inspection and Certification (TIC) (…) to help clients meet the 
challenges of QHSE and social responsibility”. Bureau Veritas is headquartered in 
Paris and went public on the Paris Bourse in October 2007. From 1996 to 2013, under 
the leadership of Frank Piedelièvre, Bureau Veritas multiplied its number of employees 
by 7, from 8,000 to 59,000, its revenues by 8, from €455m to €3,902m and expanded 




Intertek was founded in 1996 after Inchape Testing Services was acquired by 
Charterhouse development Capital, even though its origins can be traced back to the 
1890s. It defines itself as a company that goes “beyond testing, inspecting and 
certifying products (…), a Total Quality Assurance provider to industries worldwide”. 
Intertek is headquartered in London, UK, and is listed in the London Stock Exchange 
since 2002. In 2013, it had a 2.6% of market share. It currently employs 42,000 people 
in over 1,000 offices and 100 countries.  
 
This highly fragmented market has allowed the big players to grow though the 
acquisitions of the local players. Indeed, only Applus+ made more than 20 acquisitions 
during the LBO period. Furthermore, this market structure has created high barriers of 
entry, which make the positions of the big players more stable. The following table 
summarizes the four main barriers of entry. 
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Figure 10. Main barriers of entry for the TIC market. Source: Applus+ IPO Prospectus and own analysis 
The market of TIC grew overall between a 5 and 6% CAGR between year 2000 and 
2014 (Banco Portugués de Investismento, 2014). The main players of the industry also 
showed strong growth, both organically and through intense M&A activity, consistently 
outperforming GDP growth. However, the market is expected to keep on growing at a 
similar pace in the years to come. The following table summarizes the three main 
drivers of growth for the TIC market. 
 
Figure 11. Main drivers of growth for the TIC market. Source: Applus+ IPO Prospectus and own analysis 
All in all, the TIC market provided a very attractive environment for a private equity 
investment in an established company due to its structural growth and its high barriers 
of entry.  
Authorizations and
accreditations 
To operate as a TIC services provider across numerous authorizations
and accreditations are compulsory, depending on the different
jurisdictions. For instance, only Applus+ RTD has more than 100
authorizations issued by different institutions
Reputation
QHSE requirements are usually critical for the clients, which makes trust




International large clients require the ability from TIC services providers to
supply robust services across wide geographic localizations and to be
able to serve global contracts
Technical 
expertise
High technical expertise is a clear competitive advantage in this market
and would require an enormous economic investment for a new entrant
Outsourcing
Companies have tended to get rid of non-core activities and rely on the
expertise of third parties when it comes down to verification and certification
Regulations, standards and
sustainability concerns 
Sophistication of products and
assets
The increase in the QHSE-related regulation and industry standards 
widened the range of necessary TIC services. Furthermore, the increase in 
public QHSE awareness and the proactivity of companies is also 
favourable to this trend
Innovation and appearance of new technologies, as well as shorter life-
cycles of products has increased the necessity of TIC services. On the





On the 23rd of July, 2007, Carlyle announced the acquisition of Applus+ for an 
enterprise value of €1,480 million, one of the biggest private equity deals in Spain at 
that time.  
 
The structure of the deal 
 
In July 2007, as a result of the LBO, the entity Applus Services SA was incorporated in 
Spain. This company would englobe the former company under which Applus+ was 
registered, Applus Servicios Tecnológicos SA with the goal of becoming the ultimate 
umbrella company for all the subsidiaries of Applus+.  
 
At the same time, a company called Azul Holding SCA was incorporated in 
Luxembourg. This entity became the holding company of the deal and consequently 
the sole owner of Applus Services SA as a consequence of the LBO. This company 
served as the investment vehicle through which the investors invested their equity into 
the deal. Additionally, Azul Holding SCA fully owned Azul Finance SARL, a company 
through which Applus Services SA received a participating loan from its investors.  
 
The debt raised during the deal was recognised at the level of Applus Services SA. 
The following figure summarizes the structure of the deal: 
 
 
Figure 12. Deal Structure. Source: Sabi (Bureau Van Dijk) and own analysis 
 
  
Applus Services SA 
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The shareholders: The Carlyle Group and a consortium of local 
institutional investors  
 
Upon the acquisition, The Carlyle Group owned 69.05%10 of Azul Holding SCA through 
two different funds, CEP II and III Participations SARL SICAR. In second place, a 
consortium of Spanish Banks and other local institutional investors owned 22.82% of 
the company. This group of investors was represented in the deal through Volja Plus 
SA, a company that was established in Spain on November 2007. Volja Plus SA was 
led by the extinguished bank Caixa Catalunya11, which controlled a total of 7.76% of 
Azul Holding SCA. The other institutional investors at the time were Caixa Sabadell12, 
Caixa Manresa13 and Caixa de Girona14. Other local shareholders in Volja Plus SA 
were the Sanhauja and Costafreda families and GTD Invest SARL, owned by GTD, the 
aeronautical engineering company, which aimed at establishing some synergies with 
Applus+ (El Pais, 2007). The presence of local investors was a requirement by the 
Catalan Government as it owned a stake in IDIADA (20%) and LGAI (5%), both 
subsidiaries of Applus+ (El Mundo, 2007). Finally, the remaining stake was left as 
reserves aimed, among others, at management compensations (El Pais, 2007). 
 
This chart summarizes the ownership of the holding company Azul Holding SCA, i.e., 
the shareholders in the deal upon closing the deal: 
 
Figure 13. Ownership of Azul Holding SCA. Source: Sabi  
  
                                               
10
 The actual amount differs depending on the sources, especially in journalistic articles. This 
number is based on data from Sabi, the database from Bureau Van Dijk. 
11
 In 2010, Caixa Catalunya became CatalunyaCaixa, legally Catalunya Banc SA. In 2016 it was 
merged into Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) 
12
 Caixa Sabadell was merged into Unim in 2010 and was acquired by BBVA in 2010 
13
 Caixa Manresa was merged into CatalunyaCaixa in 2010 
14
 Caixa de Girona was merged into CaixaBank (La Caixa) in 2010  
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The sources of funds. Debt structure and equity invested 
 
The deal was financed through a combination of around 61% debt and 39% equity. 
The following table summarizes the debt package used through this deal, which 
totalled €1,085m, including the CAPEX line of €150m and the revolving credit facility of 
€75m. The term loans were raised through a syndication of the banks listed in the 
table, which was led by Société Général as principal agent. There was one Term B 1st 
lien secured of €610m and a Term 2L secured of €100m. On the other side, the 
mezzanine facilities were arranged by the Intermediate Capital Group PLC (ICG PLC) 
both directly and through their fund Intermediate Finance II PLC. Finally, also in 2007, 
the shareholders extended a participation loan of €369,375k15.  
Figure 14. LBO debt package. Source: Bloomberg 
The CAPEX line and the revolving credit facility were 95% and 85% refinanced 
respectively on November 2012, and their original maturities extended to 2016. In any 
case, all the debt resulting from the deal was refinanced in 2014 as a result of the IPO. 
 
The cash interests were referred to the 3-month EURIBOR, while the PIK interests 
were based on a fixed rate. The 3-month EURIBOR on the first day of July 2007 was 
4.176%. All in all, this debt structure was supposed to generate a cost of 7.615%16, 
including the cash interests and the PIK interests scheduled and summarized in the 
previous table.  
 
  
                                               
15 Interest scheme of the participating loan: 70% of non-consolidated operating and non-
operating profit every year until maturity and 5% annual fixed interest. Total Interest payable 
capped at an annual 16% of outstanding debt 
16




(bps) PIK (bps) AmortizationMaturity Refinanced
Term B 1L Sr. Secd







Term 2L Secd 100 000 500 -           Bullet 20/01/2017 13/05/2014
Term CAPEX 1l Sr. Secd 150 000 225 -           -             10/01/2014 21/11/2012
Revolver 1L Sr. Secd 75 000 225 -           -             10/01/2014 21/11/2012
PIK Term MEZZ Unsecd T1
100 000 300 500 Bullet 20/07/2017 13/05/2014
PIK Term MEZZ Unsecd T2
50 000 300 500 Bullet 20/07/2017 13/05/2014
Participating Loan
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Intermediate Capital Group PLC
Intermediate Capital Group PLC
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€k
Method 1 - Equity Bridge
2006 Applus Net Debt 513 724              415 344          53,1%
Deferred Tax Liability 153 709             550 245 541 600
2007 Goodwill recognized 444 210
Total Equity Value 966 276                   Total Equity Value 965 589             Total Equity Value 1 019 962         
Average EQV 965 933            
2006 AgBar Stake in Applus
2006 AgBar Proceeds from sale of stake
Method 3 - Former Shareholder Proceeds
Equity Valuation at Entry
Method 2 - Asset Fair Value
2006 Applus Equity Value
2007 Intangible Assets generated at acquisition
The following table summarizes the different sources of funds used to finance the deal, 
compared to the total sources of funds and the EBITDA of the company in 2016. 
 
 
Figure 15. Sources of funds. Sources: Bloomberg, Sabi and Applus+ IPO Prospectus 
The equity invested totalled €552,516k16, as recorded in the balance sheet of Azul 
Holdings SCA at inception. According to the Applus+ IPO prospectus, €369,375k of 
this equity was invested through a participation loan, through Azul Finance SARL, 
wholly owned by Azul Holding SCA. Also according to the IPO prospectus, Applus 
Services SA was established with a capital of €123,125k. 
 
The uses of funds. Equity valuation, net debt and transaction fees 
 
Upon acquisition, Applus+ was valued at an Enterprise Value of €1,480m. 
 
The equity value Applus+ was acquired at by Azul Holding SCA has been calculated 
using three different methods, as summarized in the following table.  
 
Figure 16. Calculation of the Equity Value of Applus+ at acquisition. Sources: Sabi (BvD), Applus+ IPO 
prospectus, Eleconomista.es and own analysis 
 
The first two methods are based on values from the financial statements of the Applus 
Servicios Tecnológicos in 200617 and from the Applus+ IPO prospectus. The third 
method is based on journalistic information. Finally, the total estimated value of the 
                                               
17
 Sourced from Sabi Database, Bureau Van Dijk 
Sources Amount % X/Ebitda
€k
Debt
Term B 1L Sr. Secd 610 000 43,2% 8,2x
Term 2L Secd 100 000 7,1% 1,3x
PIK Term MEZZ Unsecd 100 000 7,1% 1,3x
PIK Term MEZZ Unsecd 2 50 000 3,5% 0,7x
Term CAPEX 1l Sr. Secd -                   -           -           
Revolver 1L Sr. Secd -                   -           -           
Total Debt 860 000 61% 11,5x
Equity
Azul Holding SCA Equity 552 516 39,1% 7,4x
Equity Issue at Applus Services 123 125 8,7%
Participation Loan at Applus Services 369 375 26,2% 5,0x
Total Sources of Funds 1 412 516 100%
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equity of Applus+ in 2006 has been calculated as an average of the first two methods, 
as their results are very similar to the one obtained with the third method. Moreover, 
the sources of the first two methods ought to be more accurate than the source of the 
data used in the third method.   
 
The first method consists on the classic equity bridge formula, which deduces the Net 
Debt of the target, along with other debt-like items (such as deferred tax liabilities) from 
the enterprise value of €1,480,000k. The Net Debt of €513,724k is obtained from the 
balance sheet of Applus Servicios Tecnológicos in 2006. The result is an equity value 
of €966,276k. 
 
The second method is based on the calculation of the Goodwill and other Intangible 
Assets generated at acquisition, which are detailed in the Applus+ IPO prospectus. 
These intangibles generated at acquisition summed a total of €550,245k, which added 
to the book value of equity of Applus Servicios Tecnológicos in 2006, totals an equity 
value of €965,589k.  
 
In theory, these two methods should provide the same result. The differences are 
probably due to the lack of granularity in the data downloaded from Sabi that does not 
allow detecting potential adjustment items that should be included in the calculation of 
the equity bridge or the asset fair value. 
 
Last but not least, the third method is based on a journalistic article that sized the 
proceeds of the LBO for the former shareholder AgBar, which owned 53.1% of Applus+ 
in 2006, in €541,600k (Eleconomista.es, 2007). 
 
All in all, the uses of funds are summarized in the following table. 
 
 
Figure 17. Uses of Funds. Source: Own analysis 
The transaction fees and other adjustments have been calculated as the difference 
between the equity recognized in 2007 at the level of Azul Holding SCA and the 
participating loan; and the value of the shares subscribed at the level of Applus 
Services SA (see figure 9, sources of funds). A level of fees of around 4% of the 
Enterprise Value seems reasonable compared to the standards.  
 
All in all, the following figure summarizes the consolidated balance sheet at acquisition.  
Amount
€k
Purchase of Equity 965 933
Net Debt Refinancing 386 568
Implied % Net Debt Refinanced 75,25%
Transaction fees and other adjustments 60 016
Implied % of fees and other adjustments 4,06%





Figure 18. Consolidated Balance Sheet at acquisition. Source: Own analysis 
Where the impact of the transaction fees is already deducted from the equity value. 
 
The implied cost of capital 
 
As seen in the section about the sources of funds, the implied annual cost of debt from 
the deal debt structure is 7.615%. 
 
The CAPM model is useful to calculate the implied cost of equity in this transaction. As 
a reminder, the CAPM formula calculates the return an investor should expect from 
investing in a company, given its exposure to the entire market. 
 
The result is that the required return for an investor investing in Applus+ in July 2007 
was 6.97%. 
 
The yield of the 10-year German bond in July 2007 has been used as a benchmark for 
the risk free rate in Europe at the time of the deal. In 2007, the 10-year German bond 
was yielding an annual 4.5%. 
 
The market premium at the time was 5.10%, as estimated by JP Morgan18 (JP Morgan, 
2008). 
 
The beta of Applus+ in July 2007 has been calculated by re-levering the average 
unlevered beta from its peers SGS and Intertek in 2007, using the implied equity value 
and target net debt resulting from the deal. The unlevered betas of the peers can be 
found in the following table. 
 
Figure 19. Peers Unlevered Beta in July 2007. Source: Bloomberg 
The result is an implied beta for Applus+ in July 2007 of 0.485. 
 
Last but not least, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), has been calculated 
from the costs of debt and equity just obtained, and using the effective tax rate that 
Applus Servicios Tecnológicos had to face in 2006. The WACC obtained is 5.96%. The 
following table summarizes the calculations. 
                                               
18 This Market Premium has been calculated as the average of the three methods proposed by 
JP Morgan in the referenced report  
Entreprise Value 1 480 000 Equity Value 492 500
EBITDA x 19,9x EBITDA x 6,6x
Deal Debt 860 000
EBITDA x 11,5x











Figure 20. Calculation of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital. Source: Own analysis 
It is interesting to observe that at that time, the cost of equity was lower than the cost of 
debt before taxes. This is surprising given the fact that usually equity investments bear 
more risk than debt investments, especially in LBOs. This result might rise up some 
eyebrows on the suitability of the CAPM as a model to calculate the required cost of 
equity in a LBO. However, for sake of simplicity, this thesis is going to stick to this 
result.   
 
Governance and the Management of the company 
 
Upon the LBO, the board of directors of Applus+ was made up of 10 members, 
consisting of the Charmain, the CEO of the company, 3 independents, 4 
representatives of Azul Holding S.C.A. and one Secretary Non-director, which did not 
participate on the decisions of the board. Among the representatives of Azul Holding 
S.C.A., one of them represented Caixa Catalunya and the other 3 represented Carlyle. 
All in all, Carlyle controlled 33.33% of the votes of the board.  
 
In 2014, right before the IPO, the company was in the process of appointing a new 
non-executive independent Charmain for the Board of Directors, in substitution of Mr. 
Joaquín Coello Brufau. Mr. Coello was appointed CEO of Applus+ in December 2006, 
some months before the LBO by Carlyle. He stayed in office until the end of 2010, 
when he became the Charmain of the Board of Directors. His substitute as CEO, Mr. 
Fernando Basabé Armijo, was hired from one of the main competitors, SGS, where he 
exercised as Chief Operating Officer for the Western Europe division.  
 
As of the time of the IPO, only 4 members had not been in the board since 2007, 
including the CEO, Mr. Basabé. In particular, in 2009, Carlyle brought in Richard 
Nelson as one of the new independent members of the board of directors. Mr. Nelson 




Weigthed Average Cash Spread 2.75%
Weighted Average PIK Interest 0.69%





Market Premium 2007 5.10%
Ke 6.97%
Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Target Debt upon Acquisition 987,157
Equity Value upon Acquisition 965,933
Effective Tax Rate 34.7%
WACC 5.96%
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The senior management team of Applus+ at the time of the IPO was made up of 12 
members, including the CEO, the CFO and VPs of other functions and main business 
units. The CFO, Joan Amigó, was brought in by Carlyle in 2007, together with a 
Corporate Development Officer. More than 75% of top and mid management was 
replaced throughout the LBO period.   
 
While at the time of the IPO, no member of the Senior Management team held shares 
from Applus Services SA, some members of the Senior Management team and other 
employees had been granted shares from Azul Holding SCA, and therefore indirectly 
owned shares of Applus Services SA. At the time of the IPO, 1.61% of Azul Holding 
SCA was owned by member of the Senior Management team and other employees. 
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Analysis of the LBO. Value creation between 2007 and 
2013 
 
The skill-set of the Private Equity firm. Valuation of the company at entry 
 
The €1,480 million Enterprise Value that Applus+ was valued at upon acquisition in 
July 2007 represent an EV/EBITDA multiple of 19.9x over the EBITDA of 2006. 
 
 
Figure 21. Applus+ EV/EBITDA at Entry. Source: Sabi and Own analysis 
 
It is worth noting that this calculation is based on the numbers observed in the 
consolidated financial statements of Applus Servicios Tecnológicos in 2006 obtained 
from Sabi. Other sources, such as Industrial Capital Strategies, report an EV/EBITDA 
multiple over Fiscal Year 2006 EBITDA of 19.2x (Industrial Capital Strategies, 2012). 
 
In this section, a peer multiple analysis and a DCF analysis have been performed to 
conclude whether Carlyle overpaid or not for the acquisition of Applus+. 
 
Peer Multiple Analysis 
 
Transaction multiples  
 
The TIC Industry is a very M&A-active industry, characterized by the presence of a few 
big global players that are continuously fuelling their growth through the acquisitions of 
smaller and more regional players. However, in the past years, there has been a 
notable increase in private equity backed deals of bigger companies in the TIC 
industry. As of 2012, almost half of the top 25 TIC companies had majority or minority 
stakes by private equity firms (Industrial Capital Strategies, 2012).  
 
The following table represents the EV/EBITDA multiples that have been paid in some 
of the numerous acquisitions that took place in the industry between 2007 and 2011. 
 
Figure 22: Acquisitions in the TIC Industry prior to 2012. Source: (Industrial Capital Strategies, 2012), 
(ABN AMRO, 2014) 
€k
Entreprise Value at Entry 1 480 000
2006 Applus EBITDA 74 542
Implied EV/EBITDA at Entry 19,9x
EV/EBITDA at Entry
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These are considerably big deals, of at least €100m of EV. ABN-AMRO finds a high 
dependence between transaction multiple and the size of the company in the TIC 
industry (ABN AMRO, 2014). 
 
From this table, the acquisitions of LGC, Stork Materials Technology BV, Socotec and 
Inspicio were carried out by private equity firms. Moody international was acquired by 
Intertek, while Amdel and Inspectorate (a subsidiary of Inspicio) were acquired by 
Bureau Veritas. It is difficult to derive trends from this sample of deals, given its 
reduced size and the cyclicality of the M&A industry in general. Contrary to expected, it 
does not look like strategic acquirers payed any premium for the acquisition of the 
companies. However, it seems that companies acquired in 2007, right before the credit 
crisis, had higher valuations that those acquired between 2010 and 2012. The overall 
EV/EBITDA average of the sample is a multiple of 11.69x, while the average for the 




The following table summarizes the EV/EBITDA that the listed peers of Applus+ were 
trading at in July 2007. 
 
Figure 23. Trading multiples of Applus+'s peers in July 2007. Source: Bloomberg 
While at the time Bureau Veritas was not yet public, SGS and Intertek traded at very 
similar EV/EBITDA multiples of 13.86x and 13.08x, in the SIX Swiss and London stock 
exchanges respectively, which means an average of 13.47x.  
 
While apparently, the transaction and trading multiple analyses provide similar results 
for 2007, it is important to bear in mind that they are not directly comparable as the 
trading multiples do not include the control premium usually paid in M&A transactions 
for acquirers that expect to benefit from synergies or operational improvements on the 
targets. This is a sign indicates that, either these listed companies were overvalued at 




A DCF analysis as of end of 2006 has been carried out in order to come up with a 
valuation for Applus+, based on its business plan and a potential forecast between 
2006 and 2013 that could have been elaborated in 2006 based on the financial 
statements of Applus Servicios Tecnológicos and reasonable assumptions. 
 
First of all, the WACC of 5.96% that has been used in this DCF analysis has been 
calculated in a previous section, based on the target capital structure of Applus+ upon 
acquisition. The perpetual growth of 2% for years 2014 and beyond has been 
calculated as a proxy of the potential growth of the global GDP. 
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Regarding the assumptions of the business plan, the revenue growth for the 
transitionary state between 2006 and 2013 has been set at 5%, based on various 
reports that suggest that the TIC industry grew between 5 and 6 % in the years 
between 2000 and 20014 (Banco Portugués de Investismento, 2014). The investors 
might have had access to reports suggesting a similar growth in 2007, right before the 
financial crisis took place.  
 
EBITDA margin, depreciation as % of sales, the effective tax rate and change in 
working capital and CAPEX as % of sales were set constant at the levels of Applus+ in 
2006 to make the analysis more conservative.  
 
The result of this DCF analysis is an Enterprise Value of €1,372,760k, which implies an 
EV/EBITDA multiple of 18.4x over the EBITDA of 2006. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that this model is quite sensitive to some assumptions as it can be deduced from the 
sensitivity analysis. In particular, a reduction of the forecasted WACC to 5% would 
almost double the valuation up to a multiple of 29.6x, keeping everything else constant. 
On the other side, Changes in the sales growth rate assumed for the period between 
2006 and 2013 do not seem to alter excessively the final valuation (the multiple 
increases or decreases by around 5% for each 1% change in sales growth), as it is 
logical given the weight of the terminal value in the final result. Finally, a change in 
other assumptions such as the CAPEX % out of sales of 1% causes a change of 
around 10% in the valuation. 
 
The entire DCF model is displayed in the following figure. 
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Figure 24. DCF Valuation of Applus+ as of 2006. Source: Own analysis 
The 19.9x EV/EBITDA multiple paid by the investors at acquisition represents a 
premium of 47.7% compared to the two transactions that took place in 2007 and a 
45.8% premium compared to the trading multiples of SGS and Intertek in July 2007. 
On the other side, the transaction represents a premium of only 8% compared to the 
result obtained in the DCF.  
 
Therefore, it looks like the investors relied heavily on the potential of Applus+, the 
potential of the TIC industry as a growing industry and the ability of the management 
team to drive this company across a successful evolution. This confidence from the 
investors on their own models and forecasts, fuelled by the economic growth 
experienced in the years before the 2008 crisis, would explain the high prices paid for 
Applus+ in comparison to the transaction and trading multiples. 
 
In a nutshell, the shareholders of Azul Holding SCA payed a considerable premium 
compared to the valuation of the peers of Applus. However, the DCF valuation shows 
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that the valuation of Applus+ was not far from its fair value inferred from the growth 
projections of the industry. 
 
Management action. Improving the performance of the target company  
 
In this section, the performance of the company is going to be analysed during the 
years of the LBO, between 2007 and 2013, i.e., while Azul Holding was a majority 
shareholder of Applus Services SA. The results described in this section are mainly 
based on the analysis of the consolidated financial statements of Applus Services SA 
that have been obtained from Sabi, the database from Bureau Van Dijk that contains 
comprehensive information about companies from Spain and Portugal.  
 
Applus Services SA as a company was stablished in 2007 as a consequence of the 
LBO. As described in previous sections, before this date the company operated under 
the society named as Applus Servicios Tecnológicos SA. From this company, only the 
consolidated statements from 2006 and 2007 were found. Therefore, only a 
comparison with 2006 will be possible in this case study as to compare with the pre-
LBO period. The results of 2007 correspond to the consolidated accounts of Applus 
Servicios Tecnológicos SA, as Applus Services SA only operated for 6 months in 2007. 
 
It is worth noting that the group went through numerous acquisitions during the LBO 
period, as it will be analysed further. In particular, on December 2012, Applus+ 
acquired a controlling stake of The Velosi Group, whose accounts were consolidated 
with those of Applus Services SA at the end of December of 2012 and incorporated as 
a subsidiary under the name of Applus+ Velosi. Therefore, the results of Velosi only 
impacted the financial statements of 2013 that are not going to be directly comparable 
to those of previous years due to the strong impact of this acquisition.  
 
Operational performance improvements. EBITDA and cost structure 
 
The following chart displays the evolution of the EBITDA of the Applus+ between 2006 
and 2013 for Applus+. It is important to note that the figures have been corrected to 
exclude the impact of the deterioration of fixed assets, which was particularly high in 
2013, in order to reflect only the operational performance of the company.  In 2013, the 





Figure 25. EBITDA evolution between 2006 and 2013. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
At first glance, one can realize that the group’s adjusted EBITDA had increased 
significantly by the end of 2008, from €77,146k in 2007 to €119,388k in 2008. While 
2009 was still a good year, the company’s performance suffered a downturn between 
2010 and 2011, to rise up again in 2012 above 2009 levels. In 2013, Applus+ showed a 
considerably stronger EBITDA growth, mostly due to the acquisition and consolidation 
of Velosi, which accounted for the 18.9% of the EBITDA of 2013.  
 
In terms of CAGR, Applus+’s EBITDA grew 11% annually from 2007 to 2012, and a 
14.34% from 2007 and 2013. As it is showed in the following table, Applus+ fell down 
to the third place in EBITDA CAGR only beating SGS, in both periods 2007 to 2012 
and 2007 to 2013. Only after 2013, Applus+ got closer to the leaders Bureau Veritas 
and Intertek.  
 
Figure 26. EBITDA CAGR across peers. Source: Own analysis 
In any case, this first analysis suggests a substantial improvement of the operational 
performance of the company, which could broadly be driven either by an increase in 
revenues, an improvement in the cost structure or both.  
 
Let’s now focus on the evolution of the cost structure and leave the evolution of the 
revenues for the section about strategic improvements.  
 
The following chart represents the evolution of the EBITDA margin of Applus+ 




Figure 27. EBITDA margin evolution between 2007 and 2013 across peers. Source: Sabi, Orbis, and own 
analysis 
After an increase in EBITDA margin from 11.5% in 2007 to 14.9% in 2009, Applus+ 
EBITDA margin fell down to 10.8% in 2010 to get stabilized at 10.9% in 2012 and 
2013. Applus+ was by far the peer with the lowest EBITDA margin between 2007 and 
2013. It is therefore easy to conclude that there was no major improvement in the 
EBITDA margin of Applus+ between 2007 and 2013.  
 
Let’s look deeper into the detail of the cost structure of Applus+. The following figures 
display the disaggregation of the operational expenses of Applus+ into material costs, 
cost of employees and other operational expenses, as reported in its financial 
statements and the evolution of each of these costs as % of sales. 
 
  
Figure 28. Disaggregation of operating costs and evolution as % of sales. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
The most relevant costs are employee costs, that increased from a level of 21.7% of 
sales in 2007 up to 49.4% of sales in 2013. Materials costs were kept almost stable 
between 4% and 4.5% until 2011, but then increased up to 15.4% in 2013. Very likely, 
the acquisition of Velosi had something to do in such an increase in materials costs in 
2013.  
 
Let’s digg deeper into these employee costs. The following figure shows, on the left 
chart, the evolution of the number of employees from 2007 to 2013, while the chart on 




Figure 29. Evolution of headcount and costs of employees per employee. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
The number of employees increased by almost 60% between 2007 and 2012, from 
7,741 in 2007 to 12,334 in 2012 and 17,163 in 2013 (Velosi). There is a slowdown in 
the increase of the number of employees after 2010, which is consistent in time with 
the worse years of the recession in Spain and subsequent law reforms that facilitated 
the dismissal of employees.  
 
On the other side, as reflected in the right chart, the costs of employees per employee, 
or salaries seem to increase consistently between 2007 and 2013, except for two 
punctual downturns in 2010 and in 2013.  
 
Last but not least, the chart below shows the staff turnover between 2007 and 2013, 
i.e., the evolution of the sales per employee of Applus+. This chart is aimed to be a 
benchmark of the evolution of the productivity of the employees.  
 
 
Figure 30. Evolution of staff turnover. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
It turns out that staff turnover increased from €69,400 in 2006 to €81,670 in 2009. 2010 
was the year with the highest increase of employees, and also the year with the lowest 
staff turnover at €66,380, which translated into a reduction of the number of employees 
in 2011 and subsequent increase in staff turnover for the following years, up to €96,700 
in 2012.  
 
All in all, it seems that while the costs of employees increased substantially relatively to 
the sales of the company, this was due to a consistent increase in the number of 
employees. This increase in the number of employees was accompanied with an 
overall increase in staff turnover. All this leads to the conclusion that, overall, while the 
management team was not able to improve the EBITDA margins during the time of the 
LBO; it did a good job in improving the efficiency of the employees.  
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Strategic Improvements. Organic revenue growth and buy-and-build strategy 
 
On the side of the revenues, Applus+ performed really well since its LBO, fuelled both 
by organic growth and build-up acquisitions. The figure bellow represents the evolution 
of the revenues of the group between 2006 and 2013. In 2013, the contribution of 
Velosi is highlighted in a different pattern. 
 
 
Figure 31. Applus+ revenue evolution between 2006 and 2013. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
Similarly to the EBITDA, the revenues followed an upward trend since the LBO. 
Especially good years were 2008, with a 24.5% revenue growth, 2012, with a 21.6% 
growth and again, 2013, with a 32.5% growth mainly driven by the acquisition and 
consolidation of Velosi.  
 
The following table shows a comparison of the revenue CAGR by Applus+ and its 
peers for the periods 2007-12 and 2007-13. 
 
 
Figure 32. Revenue CAGR across peers. Source: Sabi, Orbis and own analysis 
This growth represented a CAGR of 12.2% between 2007 and 2012; and of 15.4% if 
2013 is included. 
 
In both periods, Applus+ enjoyed a higher revenue growth than the average of its peers 
and was the second among them that grew the most.  
 
The impact of acquisitions. The acquisition of The Velosi Group 
 
Like its peers, Applus+ fuelled its growth through numerous acquisitions. Only in 2013, 
organic growth represented 11.5% and 23.6% growth was due to the acquisition of 
Velosi.  
 
Sales CAGR 2007-2013 2007-2012
Applus+ 15,4% 12,2%
SGS 9,4% 7,0%
Bureau Veritas 10,1% 11,1%
Intertek 15,8% 14,9%
Peer Average 11,8% 11,0%
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The chart below describes the M&A activity of Applus+ between 2008 and 2013, both 
in terms of number of acquisitions and value of the acquisitions at the time of 
announcement. 
 
Figure 33. Number and expenditure in acquisitions. Source: Applus+ and own analysis 
While 2009 was the most active year in number of acquisitions, the M&A activity at 
Applus+ was disrupted in 2011 with the announcement of the acquisition of The Velosi 
Group. 
 
Velosi is a multinational provider of vendor surveillance, site inspection and specialized 
services in the oil and gas industry. It was founded in 1982 in Malaysia, but operated 
globally from its five headquarters in USA, UK, South Africa, UAE and Malaysia. In 
January 24th, 2011, Applus+ acquired 53% of the issued share Capital of Velosi, 
delisting it from the Alternative Investment Market of London. Applus+ payed 165 
pence per Velosi share, valuing it approximately at €105m, a 60.3% premium over the 
average closing price between November 8th and December 8th, 2010.  
 
This controlling stake of Velosi was acquired through a subsidiary of Azul Holding SCA 
called Azul Holding 2 SARL. In late December 2012, the entire issued capital of Velosi 
was contributed to the group, and its accounts were consolidated. In 2013, Velosi 
contributed with €372,568k of revenues and €32,589k in EBITDA, representing, as 
stated before, 23.6% of Applus+’s 2013 revenues. 
 
The acquisition of The Velosi Group is the most notorious example of the “buy-and-
build” strategy that Applus+ followed to grow during the LBO. 
 
The impact of acquisitions does not only show as an increase of the bottom line of the 
company, but also as the expansion of the international presence of Applus+, from 
being present in more than 40 countries around the globe in 2007, up to more than 60 
countries in 2013. 
 
In a nutshell, Applus+ showed a substantial growth on revenues during the LBO period, 
mostly backed by acquisitions. 
 
Cash-flow management. CAPEX and Working Capital 
 
The next chart summarizes the cash-flow situation in Applus+ between 2008 and 2013. 
It is necessary to note that the cash-flow analysis does not include years 2007 and 
earlier because no data has been found regarding these years. It is worth remembering 
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that Applus Services SA was incorporated in late 2007 as a result of the LBO, and this 
analysis is using the consolidated statements of Applus Servicios Tecnológiocos SA, 
the precedent parent company, for the years 2006 and 2007. Before the reform of the 
accounting norms in Spain in 2007, it was not mandatory for Spanish companies to 
elaborate and present their cash-flow statements (Plan Contable 2007, 2007).  
The following chart represents a complete snapshot of the evolution of the cash-flows 
at Applus Services SA between 2008 and 2013, where the dark line represents the 
total cash-flows and the orange line represents the free cash-flows of the company. In 
this representation, the cash-flows have been disaggregated into cash flows from 
operations (CFO), cash flows from investment activities (CFI) and cash flows from 
financing activities (CFF). 
 
 
Figure 34. Cash-flow disaggregation and evolution. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
The free-cash flows were maintained on a healthy level between 2008 and 2013, rising 
from €56,005k in 2008 to €92,594k in 2013, after a slight decrease in 2010 and 2011. 
In any case, the company was able to satisfactorily cover the cash-flows spent in 
financing activities with its free cash-flows almost every year except 2008 and 2010, 
were Applus+ had to face important debt repayments, that were in both cases covered 
with cash reserves. 
 
In any case the evolution of the cash-flow management was positive as it reached 
stable values through 2011 and 2013 at around €40,000k. There are two key elements 
of cash-flow evolution that need to be observed in more details: The evolution of the 
working capital and the evolution of CAPEX. 
 
The next figure facilitates the analysis of the evolution of the working capital. The chart 
on the left represents the working capital as a percentage of sales held by Applus+ as 
compared to the trading peers between 2007 and 2013. The chart on the right shows 
the disaggregation of the working capital at Applus+ into inventories, receivables and 




Figure 35. Working Capital as % of sales across peers and disaggregation of the working capital of 
Applus+ . Source: Sabi, Orbis and own analysis 
There was a notable increase in the current working capital of Applus+ between 2007 
and the following years, from 14.30% in 2007 to 28.82% in 2008, which was kept at 
around 30% of sales until 2013. The chart on the left clearly shows that Applus+ 
working capital was proportionally the highest across its peers, that had an average 
working capital as % of sales around 14% throughout the same period. This analysis 
shows that Applus+ established disciplined working capital management policies 
during the LBO. Indeed, the chart on the right shows that, after 2008, accounts payable 
were kept at 0, while accounts receivables, which made up most of the working capital, 
where maintained at similar levels all through the period, therefore increasing the 
working capital to the levels before mentioned. While this situation left room for 
Applus+ to finance its operations through its suppliers, the fact that it could maintain 
such a high level of working capital shows that Applus+ enjoyed healthy levels of cash 
all through the period. 
 
Let’s now look at the evolution of the CAPEX between 2008 and 2013. The following 
charts display the evolution of the CAPEX of Applus+ compared to that of its peers as 
% of sales and as % of depreciation.  
 
 
Figure 36. CAPEX as % of sales and as % of depreciation across peers. Source: Sabi, Orbis and own 
analysis 
CAPEX at the Applus+ level was the lowest among its peers both in terms of % of 
sales and in terms of % of depreciation. As % of sales, it was kept below 5% 
throughout the period, even though it almost doubled, from 2.5% in 2008 to 4.9% in 
2013. Throughout this period, the average CAPEX as % of sales of the peers was 
10.9%, with considerable spikes of Bureau Veritas and Intertek in 2010 and 2010 
respectively. If analysed deeper into detail, Applus+’s CAPEX was characterized by a 
stable level of investments between 2008 and 2013, with only considerable 
divestments in 2008, at €74,975k.  
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With regards to CAPEX as % of depreciation, Applus+ had the lowest levels compared 
to its peers as well, with an average of 78.3%, compared to 265% of its peers. The fact 
that Applus+ was the only one to have CAPEX levels below its depreciation might rise 
some red flags about whether it was able to leverage its own assets to grow as they 
were getting obsolete faster than it took for Applus+ to renovate them.  
 
All in all, Applus+ enjoyed healthy levels of cash-flows throughout its LBO, mostly 
driven by the cash obtained from its operations, disciplined working capital 
management and lower CAPEX than its peers, in another sign that Applus+ was not 
betting for organic growth.  
 
The performance of the debt structure 
 
The following chart represents the evolution of the actual cost of debt for Applus+ 
between 2008 and 2013. As a benchmark, the 5-year credit default swap spread of the 
three peers has been used, adding the 5-year German government bond as the risk-
free return. It is important to bear in mind that the three peers were listed companies 
with less risky debt profiles given due to the less levered capital structure. Also, the 
maturities of the debt at the Applus+ level were larger than just 5 years, which 
increases the implied risk of the debt. 
 
Figure 37. Evolution of the cost of debt across peers. Source: Sabi, Bloomberg and own analysis 
Applus+ kept a cost of debt slightly above the targeted cost of debt at the time of the 
deal, which was 7.61%. One of the components of this higher cost of debt is the 
interests derived from the participating loan, which were not considered in the original 
calculation. The participating loan had a complex interest scheme: 70% of non-
consolidated operating and non-operating profit every year plus a 5% annual fixed 
interest, with cap for the total annual interest payable at 16% of the outstanding debt. 
 
As expected, the cost of debt of Applus+ stayed at considerably higher levels 
compared to that of its peers. For the four companies, the cost of debt evolved to lower 
levels as the time goes by, following the EURIBOR, in an indication that Applus+, as 
well as its peers, borrowed money against floating interest rates.  
 
The following chart represents the evolution of the long term and short term debt at the 




Figure 38. Evolution of long term and short term debt. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
Overall, Applus+ kept a low level of short-term debt, compared to its long-term debt. It 
is easy to see the increase in debt due to the syndicated and the participating loans in 
the early years of the LBO, compared to the debt levels of Applus+ in 2006. During the 
time of the LBO, only the Term B 1st lien loan was partially amortized among the all the 
debt tranches of the deal syndicated loan. On November 2012, the CAPEX and 
Revolver facilities were renegotiated up to 85% and 95% respectively, and its maturity 
was extended to 2016.  
The participating loan and the corresponding accrued interests were periodically 
converted to equity at fair value until 2013, when the entire outstanding participating 
loan was converted. Finally, as it will be covered further on, the outstanding debt at the 
time of the IPO, in 2014, was fully refinanced. 
 
The following charts represent the evolution of three typical debt covenants in LBOs.  
 
   
Figure 39. Financial Covenants: Net Debt/EBITDA, EBIT/Debt Service and Interest Coverage. Source: 
Sabi and own analysis 
The Net Debt to EBITDA ratio, which includes both long term and short term debt, as 
well as the participating loan, evolved from a level of 17.9x at the time of the deal, 
down to a healthier 8.6x in 2013, in any case way above the recommended range of 4x 
to 6x considered as stable. EBIT/Debt service, which compares the company’s EBIT to 
the debt and interest payments of one period, evolved from 0.1x in 2007 to 0.7x in 
2013, still below the range of 1.1-1.2x. Last but not least, the interest coverage ratio, 
that compares EBITDA with the interests payed over the period evolved dangerously 
below 1x, and far below the recommended range of 3x to 4x.  
 
All in all, these ratios show an extremely high leverage for Applus+ and a considerably 
high cost of debt. However, Applus+ was always able to face its debt obligations 
thanks to its strong level of cash-flows.  
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Exit. The IPO 
 
At the time of the IPO, the group’s subsidiaries had been reorganized into 3 main 
business lines: Energy & industry, Statutory Vehicle Inspections and Automotive 
Engineering & Testing, as summarized by the following chart.  
 
Figure 40. Organizational Structure of Applus+ at the time of the IPO. Source: Applus+ IPO prospectus 
Not only the company had been reorganized, but also there had been a shift in the 
weight of the different business units: while in 2007 the Statutory Vehicle Inspections 
Division represented 50% of Applus+’s revenues, in 2014 Applus+ Automotive only 
represented 17%. On the other side, in 2014, Applus+ RTD, the NDT division focused 
in oil and gas, represented 35% of the revenues and Applus+ Velosi, 24%. 
 
On May 8th, 2014, Applus+ went public in the Spanish Stock Exchanges at a price of 
€14.5 per share and under the ticker APPS. Morgan Stanley and UBS were the leading 
underwriters, among which there were also Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Joh Berenberg, 
Gossler & Co and Banco Santander.  
 




Figure 41. IPO Proceeds. Source: Applus+ IPO prospectus, Bloomberg and own analysis  
 
The final IPO price of €14.50 was slightly below the mid-point between 13.25 and 
16.25, forecasted for the offering. The offering was structured into the issuance of new 
shares to raise capital for the company and the selling of part of the shares owned by 
the shareholders through Azul Holding SCA. Additionally, an over-allotment option, or 
greenshoe, was scheduled for the underwriters with a maximum of 10% of the total 
shares issued. The greenshoe was fully exercised during the 8 days after the IPO and 
the underwriters earned the entire proceeds from it. All in all, the IPO translated into a 
market capitalization of Applus+ of €1,972m, and valued the company at an enterprise 
value of around €2,600m, i.e., an EV/EBITDA of 15.1x. The following chart represents 
the split of the share ownership of Applus+ after the IPO. 
 
Figure 42. Ownership structure post IPO. Source: CMNV and own analysis 
IPO Proceeds
Initial Offering # Shares Share Price Total Capital (€)
New Shares
High Point Offering Price 18 461 538 16,25
Low Point Offering Price 22 641 509 13,25
Public Offering of existing shares
High Point Offering Price 49 230 769 16,25
Low Point Offering Price 60 377 358 13,25
Directed Offering of existing shares
High Point Offering Price 356 923 16,25
Low Point Offering Price 437 736 13,25
Actal offering
New Shares 20 899 854 14,50 303 047 889
Existing Shares 55 732 946 14,50 808 127 716
Directed offering 400 000 14,50 5 800 000
Total Shares 76 632 800 14,50 1 111 175 605
Capital Rised
Greenshoe
Total Shares 7 586 207 15,21 115 357 760
Applus did not receive any of the proceeds
Final Capitalization
Shares pre-IPO 109 327 100
Shares post-IPO 130 226 954 15,15 1 972 938 359
As of 21/05/2014
Enterprise Value 2 600 000
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The ownership structure of Azul Holding SCA was not modified after the IPO, therefore 
the ownership of each shareholder was kept proportional to their original participation. 
Azul Holding SCA kept 36% of ownership, 19% was acquired by qualified institutional 
investors while free float stood at 45%. 
 
The IPO successfully allowed the shareholders to partially cash-out and earn €808m 
for 50.97% of the shares they owned through the public offering. Additionally, the 
shareholders raised €5.8m in a directed offering to the CEO and the CFO of the 
Applus+.  
 
On the other side, Applus+ was able to rise €303m from issuing new shares, from 
which €36.2m need to be subtracted as transaction fees. Therefore the net capital 
raised from the IPO by Applus+ was around €266.8m. Along with the proceeds from 
the new shares issued at the IPO, Applus+ was able to negotiate a new term loan 
facility of €700m that will be described in detail below. With these proceeds, Applus+ 
planned to fully repay the existing syndicated loan facilities from the LBO, which at that 
time amounted to €1,047m including accrued interests, as well as to make an 
aggregate payment of €20m to some key employees as part of a management 
incentive plan. The table below summarizes the uses of the proceeds of the IPO for the 
different stakeholders.  
 
 
Figure 43. IPO Proceeds to the different stakeholders. Source: Applus+ IPO prospectus 
Finally, the following table describes the terms of the new term loan facility. 
 
Shareholders Total Capital (€)
Public Offering 808 127 716
Directed Offering 5 800 000
Total Proceeds for Shareholders 813 927 716
Applus+
Public Offering 303 047 889
IPO Fees (36 200 000)
New Term Loan Facilities 700 000 000
Total Proceeds for Applus+ 966 847 889
Underwriters
Greenshoe 115 357 760
Total Proceeds for the Underwriters 115 357 760
IPO Proceeds for the different Stakeholders
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Figure 44. New term loan facility. Source: Bloomberg 
 
This new term loan facility included the fulfilling of a financial covenant, namely, to 
reduce the ratio Net Debt to EBITDA to 4.5x before end of 2015 and to keep it below 
4x thereafter.  
 
Last but not least, following the IPO, Applus+ committed to pay an annual dividend of 
approximately 20% of its adjusted net income. 
 
The following chart represents the evolution of the share price of Applus+ from its IPO 
to April 2017.  
  
 
Figure 45. Evolution of the share price prior to IPO. Source: Bloomberg 
On the first day of trading, the shares of Applus+ closed 3.4% higher than their initial 
offering price, at €15 per share. The month after the IPO was still quite positive, letting 
the underwriters close the greenshoe quickly and at higher prices than the initial offer. 
Nevertheless, it took about two months for Applus+ to register an important fall in its 
share price. By the end of July 2014, Applus+ announced expected revenue growth for 
the second half of 2014 to be slower than expected, which brought its share price down 
13% on the day to €12.20 per share, a threshold that has not been able to overcome 
up to today. The Carlyle Group and the other investors completed their exit on June 9th, 
2016, a news that the market appreciated very well, as it can be seen as an increase of 
the share price right afterwards.  
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Analysis of the value earned by the different stakeholders 
 
Quantification of the value earned by shareholders 
 
As mentioned before, the ownership structure of Azul Holding SCA did not change 
upon the IPO, therefore keeping the ownership held by the different shareholders 
proportional. The assumption has been made that the ownership structure of Azul 
Holding SCA was also kept proportional during the progressive sales of stake after the 
IPO, therefore treating Azul Holding SCA as a unique shareholder.  
 
The following chart represents the evolution of the ownership of the holding until it 
completely sold out its stake in Applus Services SA in June 2016. Upon the IPO, the 
shareholders had a lock-up period of 180 days, during which they were not allowed to 
sell their shares. The chart does not take into account the effect of potential RSUs that 
could have vested in May 2015. It is worth remembering that this stake was acquired 
both as equity issue and through a participation loan that was afterwards capitalized 
into equity.  
 
Figure 46. Evolution of Applus Services SA ownership. Source. Sabi 
It is worth noting how the initial reserves change to ownership by the mezzanine 
investors Investment Intermediate Jersey Limited and ICG European Fund 2006, as 
well as to equity owned by the managers and other employees. Their returns are going 
to be evaluated later on. At the time of the IPO, the mezzanine investors held an 
ownership of 6.34%, while the management owned 1.61%. There was only a slight 
change of ownership in 2013, where Carlyle became the owner of 71.93% of Azul 
Holding SCA and Volja Plus SL got its ownership diluted to 19.60%.  
 
As for the progressive exit of Azul Holding SCA, the shareholders sold 11.83% of their 
stake the 14th of April of 2015 at a share price of €10.804 per share. On the 1st of April 
of 2015, they sold around 10% of their remaining stake at €7.741 per share. Finally, 
they sold their remaining 13.97% on the 9th of June of 2016, at a price of €7.895 per 
share19. 
 
The following table summarizes the capital invested and earned by the original 
investors of Azul Holding SCA, excluding the ownership of the mezzanine investors 
                                               
19 This numbers are based on the ownership data from Sabi 
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and the management team, from its initial investment in 2007, to its final divestment in 
2016. The holding did not earn any dividends during the period of the LBO, but 
Applus+ did distribute dividends after the IPO. The capital proceeds are the result of 
selling shares of Applus Services SA. The assumption has been made that the 
dividends earned by the shareholders are proportional to the average ownership 
throughout the period.   
 
 
Figure 47. Distribution to shareholders, IRR and MoIC. Source: Own analysis 
 
According to this table, the original shareholders, such as The Carlyle Group, earned a 
total IRR of 9.95%, or a MoIC of 2.0x across nine years. The PI of only 0.2x has been 
calculated using the cost of equity at the time of the deal, of 6.97%. This low value 
shows an unattractive investment mainly due to its long duration and low performance 
post-IPO. 
 
Digging deeper into the value created for shareholders, the following chart represents 
the disaggregation of the achieved IRR into the main value creation levers for LBOs: 
organic20 revenue effect, organic20 EBITDA margin effect, the acquisition of Velosi, the 
EV/EBITDA multiple effect and the leverage effect. Additionally, a stock market effect 
has been added to account for the change in value earned by the shareholders due to 




Figure 48. Disaggregation of the realized IRR into the value creation levers. Source: Own analysis 
In order to calculate the value created through the different levers, the differentiation 
has been made between three IRR calculations: The unlevered IRR, the levered IRR in 
                                               
20
 Organic effect refers to revenue and margin growth without taking into account the acquisition 
of The Velosi Group. No further discrimination can be made with other acquisitions due to lack 
of information 
€ k 2016 2015 2014 … 2007
Capital Invested -                     -                     -                    -          (552 516)        
Dividends 2 886                  5 051                 2 921                 





2014 and the realized IRR. The unlevered and levered IRR in 2014 have been 
calculated as if the shareholders had exited all at once at the time of the IPO and they 
represent the value created as of 2014. The difference between the levered and the 
unlevered IRRs is the leverage effect, which accounts for a 57.96% of the value 
created as of 2014. The second most important lever is the revenue growth, excluding 
the effect of the acquisition of Velosi, with 38.65% of the levered IRR in 2014. The 
acquisition of Velosi accounts for 28.28%. Last but not least, there is value destruction 
due to the multiple effect as the exit multiple of 15.1x was lower than the entry multiple, 
of 19.9x. 
 
Finally, the realized IRR was reduced from a 19.94% achieved in 2014 to a 9.95% 
throughout the progressive exit of the shareholders. This value destruction was due to 
the reduced valuation of Applus+ in the public markets, as elaborated on before. This 
reduction in almost 10% of the IRR represents a loss of €1,771k21 for the shareholders, 
calculated as the present value in 2014. Indeed, Applus+ lost 45.51% of Market 
Capitalization between the IPO and the last sale of stake by the LBO shareholders. 
 
All in all, the shareholders were able to earn a positive economic return from their 
investment in this LBO. Nevertheless, was this the return they were expecting to 
achieve, as to compensate the risks undertaken throughout the LBO? While the 
achieved IRR in 2016 is higher than the cost of equity calculated by CAPM as of 2007, 
the latest does not reflect the risk of the LBO.   
 
The following charts represent the average returns achieved by global private equity 
funds as of end of 2015. 
 
 
Figure 49.Global private equity fund IRR as of end 2015.Source: (Bain & Company, 2016)  
The chart shows that, funds started in 2007 in Europe, achieved on average around 
8% IRR, while top-quartile performers achieved slightly more than 10%. This result 
could indeed be used as an ex-post benchmark for the shareholders of Applus+ during 
the LBO: Besides the reduction of IRR achieved due to the stock market effect 
                                               
21
 Calculated as the difference between the proceeds as if earned in 2014 and the market 
capitalization in 2014, using the cost of capital of the deal, i.e., 6.97%. 
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between 2014 and 2016, the shareholders were able to achieve an IRR in line with the 
average of the funds started in the same year in Europe.  
 
Quantification of the earned by the company 
 
The following charts represent the evolution of the WACC of the company, compared 
to the evolution of its RoCE and the disaggregation of the evolution of the RoCE into 
Capital employed turnover and after tax EBIT. For the calculation of the WACC, the 
cost of equity has been kept constant at the level of 2007, i.e., 6.97%. The cost of debt 
has been calculated as the ratio between financial interest expenses and the total debt 
of the company every year. The equity value has been kept at the entry level of 2007. 
Finally, the tax rate has also been kept constant at the level of 2007, i.e., 34.2%, to 
avoid accounting for the effect of the fluctuation in the effective tax rate. 
 
   
Figure 50. Comparison of the RoCE and the WACC of the company and disaggregation of the RoCE. 
Source: Sabi and own analysis 
The charts above reflect economic value destruction for the company, with RoCE 
increasing between 2007 and 2008, from 2.5% to 4.5%, but then all the way down 
again to 2.5% in 2010 and 2011. RoCE was up to 4.2% in 2013, and only overcame 
the WACC of the company in 2015, at 5%. One of the causes of the lower WACC after 
2014 is very likely the refinancing of the debt after the IPO. 
The evolution of the RoCE was driven by an after tax EBIT margin that, after increasing 
up to 7% in 2008, decreased every LBO year until its minimum in 2013 at 2.7%. The 
declining trend of the decreasing EBITDA margin is worsened by ever increasing 
depreciation expenses. On the other side, the capital employed turnover just followed 
an ever increasing trend, showing efficiency improvement already detected in previous 
sections, from 0.5 in 2007 up to 1.6 in 2013. 
 
The chart below represents the value destruction at the company level calculated as 
the evolution of the EVA, as well as the MVA both in 2014 and in 2016. The MVA is 
calculated as the present values of the EVA in each period, using the WACC of the 




Figure 51. Economic Value Added and Market Value Added. Source: Sabi and own analysis 
Indeed the value destruction is represented by an ever more negative EVA from 2007 
to 2013, even though the trend reverts after 2010, when the EVA becomes less 
negative period after period, and becomes positive for the first time in 2015, after the 
IPO.   
The total market value added is €-236,295k and €-247,405 in 2014 and 2016 
respectively. 
 
In a nutshell, economic value was destroyed at the company level, as the Return on 
the Capital Employed did not overcome the Cost of Capital of the company. 
 
Quantification of the value earned by the management team 
 
It is difficult to quantify the actual value earned by the management team of the 
company through the LBO, due to the lack information thereof. As argued earlier in this 
thesis, the economic value earned by the management team can be understood as the 
mix between their fixed salary, their variable salary or bonus and the value of the equity 
earned as part of the management incentive package. 
 
In the case of Applus+, no information is available on the evolution of the salary of the 
managers during the LBO period. However, the assumption can be made that it is in 
line with the standards of the labour market in Spain for such positions, and therefore 
no additional value was earned by them due to the LBO.  
 
What can be learnt from the IPO prospectus is that 9 members of the management 
team and 37 other employees, that do not include the CEO, owned 1.61% of the 
company’s shares at the time of the IPO due to incentive plans. The company also 
estimated that 18 employees could receive a cash payment upon admission of 
€1,250k.  
 
Furthermore, due to a cash and share based management incentive plan, 10 senior 
managers received approximately €20m in cash payments after the IPO, out of what 
Mr. Basabé, the CEO, received €9,95m. Additionally, they also received 2,762,869 
RSUs that entitled for one share each at the offering price, out of which, Mr. Basabé 
received 1,215,213 RSUs. The RSUs had a vesting period of three years in three equal 
instalments, i.e., , they could be converted into shares every 9th of May beyond 2014. 
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Last but not least, at the time of the IPO, Mr. Basabé and Mr. Amigó, the CEO and 
CFO, obtained a loan of €5 million and €800k respectively, to purchase shares of 
Applus+ at the offering price of €14.50. The maturity of these loans was 3 years at an 
annual fixed interest rate of 4% and with a lock-up period of 360 days.  
 
The following table summarizes the economic value earned by Mr. Basabé. 
 
 
Figure 52. Value earned through CEO's incentive plan. Source: Applus+ IPO prospectus and own analysis 
Only the RSUs were initially valued at more than €17.62m. However, assuming a 
vesting value for May 9th, 2017 at €11.10 per share, the last value observed during the 
elaboration of this paper, the overall value of this RSUs has become negative at more 
than €-5.69m. On the other side, Mr. Basabé has so far lost money in his investment in 
shares of the company at the time of the IPO, concretely more than €1.77m. All in all, 
Mr. Basabé’s incentive plan final value is only €2.61m, which represents only 8.16% of 
the originally expected value of the incentive plan. If it were not thanks to the cash 
payment upon the IPO of €9.95m, Mr. Basabé would have lost money on the deal.  
 
Quantification of the value earned by the debt holders 
 
There were essentially two types of debt holders in this deal and through the 
syndicated loan: the term debt holders, led by Société Générale and the mezzanine 
investors, funds owned in last instance by Intermediate Capital Group PLC.  
 
The entire syndicated loan was refinanced at the time of the IPO through the new debt 
facility.  
 
Regarding the term debt holders, as the company did not default until the IPO, their 
annual returns are equivalent to the cash interest that the company payed during the 
RSUs # RSUs Share Price Total Capital (€)
Value at IPO. 09/05/2014 1 215 213 14,50 17 620 593
1st Vesting. 09/05/2015 405 071 10,95 4 435 529
2nd Vesting. 09/05/2016 405 071 7,70 3 119 047
3rd Vesting. 09/05/2017(*) 405 071 11,10 4 496 289
(*) valued at share price of 10/04/2017
Direct offering value earned (5 569 728)
Fixed Cash Payment 9 950 000
Direct Offering
Value at IPO 344 828 14,50 5 000 000
Loan Interests (4% p.a.) (600 000)       
Value as of 10/04/2017 344 828 11,10 3 827 586     
Direct offering value earned (1 772 414)
Original incentive plan value 31 970 593
Total Value Earned 2 607 859          8,16%
Value earned through CEO's incentive plan
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LBO period. This interest was floating and linked to the evolution of the 3-month 
EURIBOR, as described in the chart below.  
 
 
Figure 53. Annual term debt returns for the debtholders. Source: own analysis 
Between 2007 and 2013, the Term B 1st lien yielded an average 4.1% interest, the 
Term 2nd lien yielded 6.6% and the CAPEX and Revolver facilities yielded 3.8% over 
the drawn down quantities. With a 3-month EURIBOR of 4.7% in July 2007, the Term B 
1st lien was expected to yield an interest of 7.2%, the Term 2nd lien was expected to 
yield a 9.7% and the CAPEX and Revolving facilities, a 6.95%. The interests earned by 
the term debt holders were obviously negatively affected by the declining trend of the 
reference rates such as the EURIBOR. 
 
Regarding the mezzanine investors, their value earned can be divided into the cash 
interests earned and the value of the equity earned through the conversion of the PIK 
interests. As mentioned before, at the time of the IPO, the mezzanine investors IPG 
PLC owned 6.34% of the share capital of Azul Holding SCA. The following table 
summarizes the proceeds for the mezzanine investors.  
 
Figure 54. Proceeds to mezzanine investors. Source: Own analysis 
The cash interests are based on a floating rate related to the EURIBOR, the dividend 
proceeds are calculated upon the average ownership throughout the period and the 
capital interests come from the progressive sale of shares of Azul Holding SCA. 
 
The mezzanine investors achieved an IRR of 14.02%, a MoIC of 1.1x and a PI of 0.9x. 
Again with a 3-month EURIBOR at 4.7% in July 2007, the mezzanine investors should 
have expected a return of 12.7%. Despite the fall in interest rates, the mezzanine 
investors were able to achieve higher returns than expected, over performing the 
equity holders.  
 
€ k 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Mezzanine investment and repayment -                     -                     150 000              -                 -                 -                  -                   -                -          (150 000)        
Cash Interests -                     -                     4 926              4 782             6 515               6 002               5 550             8 789       11 498           
Dividends 182                    319                    185                    -                 -                 -                  -                   -                -          -                







The results of the case study are not necessarily consistent with the conclusions 
reached by researchers, such as the ones mentioned in the literature review of this 
thesis. While working with large data samples allows researchers to extract statistically 
significant conclusions, the results obtained in this thesis are a clear example that there 
is no such thing as the average LBO. 
 
As a target company in 2007, Applus+ was a good fit given its healthy performance 
and the fact that it operated in an industry with very high barriers of entry and a 
forecasted annual growth of 5% for the years to come. This is why The Carlyle Group 
and the other shareholders paid a considerably high price for Applus+, as reflected by 
a valuation of 19.9x EV/EBITDA at acquisition, compared to the 13.65x obtained from 
2007 comparable transactions, 13.47x from trading peers and 18.4x from the DCF 
analysis.  
Substantial performance improvements were achieved as a result of Management 
action. This was reflected by an overall EBITDA CAGR of 14.3% from 2007 to 2013, 
considerably above the peer average of 12.6% for the same period. This improvement 
in EBITDA was essentially driven by a boost of the revenues of the company that grew 
at CAGR of 15.4%. This growth in revenues was fuelled by an intense M&A activity, as 
reflected by the acquisition of more than 20 companies during the LBO period. In 
particular, the activities of The Velosi Group represented 23.6% of the revenues of 
Applus+ in 2013.  
Another important value creation lever tapped by the Management team was the 
imposition of a disciplined management of the company’s cash-flows, by keeping 
CAPEX at the lowest level compared to its peers, below 5% of sales and at an average 
of 78% of depreciation expenses; and maintaining a high level of working capital, at 
around 30%. This policy was key in coping with a highly leveraged capital structure of 
17.9x Net Debt/EBITDA at the time of the acquisition, taking into account the debt of 
the deal and the debt that was not refinanced. At the time of the IPO, Net Debt/EBITDA 
ratio was down to a healthier 8.6x. 
 
The results of the value earned analysis show important differences across 
stakeholders. The shareholders achieved an IRR of only 9.95% in 2016, once they 
exited completely their investment in Applus+. While the average of the IRR achieved 
by the end of 2015 in private equity investments entered in 2007 was around 8%, this 
result is quite disappointing given the fact that the unrealized IRR at the time of the IPO 
was 19.94%. Applus+ lost 45.51% of Market Capitalization between the IPO and the 
last sale of stake by the LBO shareholders. This result is not consistent with the 
findings of Loss described in the first part of this paper, were it was stated that on 
average IPO exits provided higher returns to shareholders compared to strategic sales 
(Loos, 2005). Indeed, if Applus+ had been completely exited in 2014 through a direct 
sale (be it strategic or to a financial sponsor), it is very likely that the shareholders 
would have obtained higher returns, given the valuation of the company at the time of 
the IPO.  
This depreciation in the share value of Applus+ after the IPO affected very negatively 
the value earned by the Managers. In particular, Mr. Basabé earned only 8.16% of the 
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value he was expected to earn through its incentive plans. While Management action 
was key in the value creation throughout the deal, the managers saw their value 
earned substantially reduced compared to their expectations.  
 
The value earning analysis for the Target Company suggests that economic value was 
destructed for Applus+, as the company was not able to achieve a RoCE higher than 
its WACC. This is reflected by a negative EVA for almost every period between 2007 
and 2013, following a negative trend that was reverted in 2015 as the company 
achieved a higher RoCE than its WACC. At the same time, however, Applus+ share 
price was falling in the stock exchange. This is just a further example of the fact that 
value earned at the company level does not correspond with value earned by the 
shareholders.  
 
Last but not least, the value earned by the debt holders differed across different risk 
profiles. Term debt holders’ returns decreased due to the use of floating rates. 
However, the mezzanine investors achieved an IRR of 14.02% thanks to the 
conversion of accrued PIK interests into equity. This is a higher return compared to 
their initial expectations of around 12.7%. All in all, mezzanine investors achieved the 
highest return compared to the shareholders, which is not consistent with the classical 
risk-return trade-off theory.  
 
The results obtained from this case study were subject to various limitations. In 
particular, the lack of detail in information related to the company during the time of the 
LBO jeopardized the elaboration of complete conclusions. One example is the missing 
further information about the acquisitions undergone that would have allowed for more 
precise calculation of their real impact. Another example is the lack of granularity in the 
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